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Authors Name: Sudhir A. Shah

On The Optimal Coordination Of Uninformed Agents by an Informed Principal

They consider organizations with a single principal and many agents who interact in an environment with the following features: (a) Nature imperfectly informs the principal via a state-contingent si...

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Comparative Riskiness of Random Vector Outcome

In this paper they introduce two other notions of the comparative riskiness of lotteries with vector outcomes. [Working Paper No. 191]

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Optimal Pollution Regulation in a Dynamic Stochastic Model

The context for this paper is the interaction between a rm that produces and processes durable pollution and a regulator charged with the tasks of (a) employing a mandated technology to process the p...

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Comparative Risk Aversion When the Outcomes are Vectors

Pratt (1964) and Yaari (1969) contain the classical results pertaining to the equivalence of various notions of comparative risk aversion of von Neumann- Morgenstern utilities in the setting with re...

On 27 Sep 2010

An Economic Theory of Emission Cap Determination By an International Agreement

The objective of this paper is twofold. Firstly, to propose a conceptual and institutional framework for the first step of the Kyoto procedure. This framework is formally expressed in a non-cooperativ...

On 09 Sep 2010