The February 13 Agreement: A New Dawn for North Korea’s Denuclearization?

The aim of this paper is to analyze the February 13 Agreement’s implementation along with the prospects for the denuclearization of North Korea. The paper starts with an overview of North Korea’s complex fiftyyear history of attempting to acquire nuclear power, then continues to describe the main topic: the February 13 Agreement. Part One outlines the February 13 Agreement and its implementation until the end of 2007. It analyzes the February 13 Agreement by comparing it with the Agreed Framework. Part Two analyzes the Bush Administration’s abrupt turnaround in policy. Previously it had maintained a tough stance toward North Korea prior to reaching the February 13 Agreement. It is asserted that the U.S. has faced a “confidence dilemma” in the Middle East, and that the Republican Party’s defeat in the Midterm election was a decisive factor behind Bush’s new approach in regard to normalizing relations between the U.S. and North Korea.Part Three explores the motivations behind North Korea’s return to the SixParty Talks. It seems likely that the key reasons were that the U.S. had made some changes and concessions in its hostile approach by proposing bilateral negotiations, lifting the sanctions on the BDA bank account, and by initiating a process toward the normalization of diplomatic relations. Part Four examines why North Korea has started dismantling its nuclear program and strives toward the normalization of ties with the U.S. It can be argued that North Korea is trying to find a breakthrough so as to obtain security assurances from the U.S. and also as a means of attempting to settle its energy and economic problems. After examining the external and internal factors at work in North Korea’s current position regarding its nuclear issue, the paper concludes with a more general look ahead to the potential implications of the February 13 Agreement.