Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India

Published By: BREAD on eSS | Published Date: April, 02 , 2008

Politicians face high-powered electoral pressures while bureaucrats face longer-term, low powered incentives. Given constitutional constraints, what incentives do politicians employ to control bureaucrats and how do bureaucrats respond to such incentives? These issues are addressed using a sample model where politicians use posts of varying importance to motivate bureaucrats, who respond by investing in skill or political loyalty to get important posts. Using data from the Indian Administrative Service, evidence for several key implications upon entering office are analysed. [WP no. 178].

Author(s): Lakshmi Iyer, Anandi Mani | Posted on: Dec 02, 2008 | Views(1850) | Download (1512)


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