Opportunism and Hold-up in the Incomplete Public Private Partnership (PPP) Contracts

Published By: Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, M | Published Date: March, 01 , 2018

This paper attempts to find the answer to this question. It examines the contract design of the Indian PPP road contracts and analyzes its strengths and weaknesses to avoid the opportunism or hold-up using the probabilistic framework. This framework suggests that each type of contract should have its own self-enforcing range to make it incentive compatible. This paper compares the risk allocated in the two types of contracts (i.e. linked and delinked contracts) for delivering the project on time. Further, it empirically tests these findings using 82 PPP projects.

Author(s): Chandan Kumar | Posted on: Apr 05, 2018 | Views() | Download (141)


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