SOCIAL CLEAVAGES, MULTICULTURALISM AND EMERGING SPACE FOR STATE IN INDIA UNDER GLOBALISATION REGIME

Dr Sarojini Mishra , Dr Nirod Palai, Dr Kumar Das

ABSTRACT:

The multiculturalism ,social cleavages and ongoing globalization movement has profound impact on the role of the state. This paper makes a historical analysis and examines the validity of Weberian discovery of the influence of religion on the political economy of India. Machiavelli had reckoned deception , falsehood and tricks to defeat an enemy as acceptable part of the statecraft, which Chanakya propounded 2000 years before. Stealing an election has been a common place event of late in the greatest democracy as much as in the largest one on the earth. This paper attempts to examine this Indian syndrome . There are several evidence of links of social fragmentation resulting in political conflict over economic policy. The conventional view of social fragmentation fails to account for a critical determinant of conflict incentives: the extent to which social cleavages based on different politically salient characteristics act to mutually reinforce versus cut across one another. This paper focuses on social cleavages based on class , caste,religion and ethnicity in India. It examines the political salience of caste and class conflicts and addresses the translation of social cleavages into political oppositions in India. This paper argues that political conflict becomes more severe when social cleavages based on class, caste and ethnicity help to mutually reinforce one another. It presents Indian evidences in order to demonstrate the link between social fragmentation and fiscal policy outcomes under liberalization regime.

Dr (Ms) Mishra is the Head of Dept of Economics of Brahmanajharilo College, Cuttack, India , email: srjn115@hotmail.com
Dr Palai is the Head of Dept of Economic History , Bijupatnaik College of Utkal University, Bhubaneswar, India, Email: nirodpalai@yahoo.co.in
@ Dr Kumar Professor, Asian University,Chonburi 120150, Thailand,

After globalization movement in India, the state is fast losing its aura. Its authority is being chipped away and its monolithic monopoly is crumbling. Polity, economy and society, every domain of life of Indian thus facing an unprecedented trauma under statelessness. Its sweep and magnitude are overwhelming. Samuel Huntington once spoke of a clash of civilizations: it seems more like a crash of civilization. But there has been a sea change in the information and communication technology .Urban life for the elite class has become as glamorous and comfortable as any where. Every corner of the earth is hooked up in global transmission net work. A digital divide has taken place with haves and have nots of internet capability. There is veritable grip of social cleavages, communal conflicts, false belief and myths in the society. The contemporary rise in Hindutva movement is more or less necessary by- product of the process of globalization. The two are also mutually contradictory. It is useful to observe these two sets of relations-one is complementary and other is contradictory. So it is very difficult to predict the emerging role of the state and future perspective for Indian society.

1.1 INDIA'S SECULARISM

One of the countries that voted in favour of the Declaration of human rights adopted by UN general assembly in 1948 was India, which had become a member of the United Nations soon after the attainment of its independence in 1947. While Article 2 of the Declaration guarantees all the rights set forth in it without any distinction on the ground of religion and such other attributes as race and colour. Article 18 specifically focuses on the freedom of religion. It reads as follows: Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion It was only in 1976, during the 'Emergency' regime of prime minister Indira Gandhi, that the word 'secular' was introduced into the Preamble of the Constitution by the 42nd Amendment. It was thus that India came to be characterised as a 'Sovereign, Socialist, Secular, Democratic Republic'. Article 15 of the Indian Constitution prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion, caste, sex, or place of birth; Article 16 guarantees equality of opportunity in matters of public employment irrespective of one's religious identity; and Article 17 abolished the practice of untouchability. Articles 25 to 30 deal specifically with the freedom of religion. Secondly, all the freedoms and rights conferred by Articles 25-30 were made "subject to public order, morality and health. It is well known that conversion has been the principal means by which the Christian faith was established in India two thousand years ago. Those who arrived from abroad and made converts, and those who came specifically to make converts, never came in hordes, and they did not have the support of the state. [1] In the years following independence, the work of Christian missionaries, who included foreigners, continued to be the large case of suspicion, particularly in areas such as Madhya Pradesh and Orissa, which has large tribal populations, and where strict anti-conversion laws of some of the erstwhile 'native' states had lapsed following the integration of these states into the India union. The government of Madhya Pradesh took the lead and set up a committee. Nevertheless, they became basis of new legislation on the issue of freedom of religion in Orissa (1967) and Madhya Pradesh (1968). The basic premise of the Orissa Freedom of Religion Act (1967) is that: "Conversion in its very process involves an act of undermining another faith. This process becomes all the more

objectionable when this is brought about by recourse to methods like force, fraud, material inducement and exploitation of one's poverty, simplicity and ignorance. An intractable problem that persists in this context is how to determine with absolute certainty that a particular act of conversion is voluntary or not, that it is fair and not fraudulent, sincere and not contrived. The criteria laid down in the various pieces of legislation are not wholly feasible. The best guardian of freedom of religion, is the civil society.

1.2 MULTICULTURALISM IN INDIA

Multiculturalism or cultural pluralism is fundamental to the belief that all citizens are equal. Multiculturalism in India ensures that all citizens can keep their identities, can take pride in their ancestry and have a sense of belonging. Acceptance gives each Indian citizen a feeling of security and self-confidence, making them more open to, and accepting of, diverse cultures. [2] India has embraced diversity, or cultural pluralism in both policy and practice. The Indian Constitution which is the source of many state policies can be said to be a basic multicultural document, in the sense of providing for political and institutional measures for the recognition and accommodation of the country's diversity. Cultural diversity is viewed as one of India's most important attributes, socially and economically. Through multiculturalism, India recognizes the potential of all citizens, encouraging them to integrate into their society and take an active part in its social, cultural, economic and political affairs. Our advantage lies in having been a multicultural society from our earliest days. Our diversity is a national asset. India contains the entire globe within its borders. Multiculturalism is a relationship between the state and the Indian people. Our citizenship gives us equal rights and equal responsibilities. By taking an active part in our civic affairs, we affirm these rights and strengthen India's democracy. The essence of inclusiveness is that we are part of a society in which language, colour, education, sex and money need not, should not divide us.

A multicultural society cannot be stable and last long without developing a common sense of belonging among its citizens. Although equal citizenship is essential to fostering a common sense of belonging, it is not enough. Citizenship is about status and rights; belonging is about acceptance, feeling welcome, a sense of identification. The two do not necessarily coincide. One might enjoy all the rights of citizenship but feel that one does not quite belong to the community and is a relative outsider. This feeling of being fully a citizen and yet an outsider is difficult to analyse and explain, but it can be deep and real and seriously damage the quality of one's citizenship as well as one's sense of commitment to the political community. It is caused by, among other things, the manner in which the wider society defines itself, the demeaning ways in which the rest of its members talk about these groups, and the dismissive or patronizing ways in which they treat them. Although members of these groups are in principle free to participate in its public life, they often stay away for fear of rejection and ridicule or out of a deep sense of alienation.

Multiculturalism is best understood neither as a political doctrine with a programmatic content nor a philosophical school but as a perspective on or a way of

viewing human life. In India it has three central insights: First, human beings are culturally embedded in the sense that they grow up and live within a culturally structured world and organize their lives and social relations. Second, different cultures represent different systems of meaning and visions of the good life. Since each realises a limited range of human capacities and emotions and grasps only a part of the totality of human existence, it needs other cultures to help it understand itself better, expand its intellectual and moral horizon, stretch its imagination, and so on. Third, every culture is internally plural and reflects a continuing conversation between its different traditions and strands of thought. This does not mean that it is devoid of coherence and identity, but that its identity is plural, fluid and open. Cultures grow out of conscious and unconscious interactions with each other, define their identity. A culture cannot appreciate the value of others unless it appreciates the plurality within it; A culture cannot be at ease with differences outside it unless it is at ease with its own internal differences. A dialogue between cultures requires that each should be willing to open itself up to the influence of and learn from others, and this presupposes that it is self-critical and willing and able to engage in a dialogue with itself.

1.3 SOCIAL CLEAVAGES IN INDIA :

Social cleavage denotes a meaningful and enduring division in society, around which social forces define themselves and may engage in political mobilization.[3] Cleavages based on class and ethnicity polarize the society. Debates over class are often very confusing. First, class represents a special kind of status group marked by distinctive life styles, tastes, and sensibilities. It is represented by non economic sources of social cleavage – such as caste, religion or ethnicity. Second, class explains inequalities in economically-defined life chances and standards of living. Here, it is not defined by subjectively-salient attributes of a social location, but rather by the relationship of people to income-generating resources or assets of various sorts. The system of inequality generated by their relationship to these resources, and lifestyles in turn may be consolidated into salient identities. Third, class represents economic cleavages in society that systematically generate overt Conflicts. Inequalities in economic opportunities, generate antagonisms of interest. Finally, class represents a sorts of struggles against exploitation and oppressions This is a much more complex and normatively contentious question. By virtue of the nature of the cleavage on which the conflict is based, contain the potential to transform the very nature of the game itself. Some sociologists proclaim that class is disappearing, which they mean that people are less likely to form stable identities in class terms and thus less likely to orient their political behavior on the basis of class, while others proclaim that class remains an enduring feature of contemporary society, by which they mean that a person's economic prospects in life continue to depend significantly on their relationship to economically valuable assets of various sorts. Here we analyse the real situation prevailing in India.

In India , political parties evolve in response to the interests of social cleavages. Group identities affect attitudes and interests. Not only do group identities influence voting behaviour in India, but that cleavage structures determine the number of political parties. These attitudes in turn affect how people vote. It is difficult to deny the existence

of social cleavages and their potential effects on attitudes and voting. Social classes have stronger relationships to attitudes and vote in India The parents are more successful in passing on their partisanship to their children. Partisanship is not only an attitude, but also a prominent cause of important political behaviors. If voters are rational actors we should expect that their electoral choices will reflect the concerns of the groups to which they belong. If these groups have a strong political presence—i.e., a viable political party represents their concerns—then voters are inclined to vote for them. Vote and attitudes are highly related—e.g., right-wing voting will be associated with right-wing attitudes— since attitudes are affected by the platform of the party voters support. Social class affects left-right attitudes and vote similarly.[4] The attitudes are, at least partly, determined by social group membership. Whole country should not necessarily been treated as homogenous region; that even in apparently similar regions there can be differences in group attitudes and voting. The sociological explanation of voting behaviour holds most often when there are strong parties representing the interests of the relevant social groups. There is no party representing specific religious interests in any of the regions of India. Parties competing for their vote in regions having strong religious cleavages allow us to better test the impact of religiosity on vote. The partisan strength can be conceptualized in many different aspects, including attitudinal stability, support intensity, as well as the subsequent political behavior that was influenced such as electoral stability. Party strength does vary .Therefore, when comparing partisan strength across nations, we have to be cautious with the criteria used, and avoid making conclusive statements with any single indicator. We also found that attitudinal factors have less influence over partisan strength, when compared to constitutional and institutional factors. Also, many factors could increase partisan strength in certain areas but decrease partisan strength in other areas at the same time.

1.4 HINDUTVA AND HINDUISM

In order to understand the specific spatial strategies of hindutva today, it is necessary to look into the historical context from which they have emerged. From the perspective of this paper, the relevant historical context .is that of the interaction among the spatial aspects of colonialism, nationalism and communalism, which was also the process through which 'India' emerged as a nation . The spatial strategies of nationalism involved the attempt to translate the facts of social geography into matters of faith, belief and, ultimately, received experience. These included conscious efforts to 'historicise' the nature, the most obvious manifestation of which is the figure of 'Mother India', Through insistent and widely disseminated patriotic songs and writings, the physical features of the subcontinent- mountains, rivers, oceans and regions -were transformed into a common national heritage over which every Indian, even if she/he had never seen that particular part of the country, was made to feel a sense of proprietary pride. Our national anthem, for example, is a typical nationalist device for converting geography into ideology.

However, crucially, such spatial strategies included those that explicitly or implicitly appealed to shared religious or communitarian sentiment. In other words, there

was nothing inherent in nationalist spatial strategies that prevented their use by groups based on religious or regional identities. Indeed, there were areas in which religious groups, especially Hindus, were at a significant advantage, because they could build on the powerful base of sacred geographies. Given the absence of any national community that was supra- or non-religious, attempts to construct an 'imagined community' had to fall back on whatever existed in living memory that could be used to help concretise this new and unfamiliar notion. Thus, even self- consciously non-communal nationalists could not afford to ignore the mnemonic aids and powerful, long- familiar metaphors offered by the popular sense of history and geography, a sense inevitably inflected by religion. Moreover, the concept as well as the concrete political identity of 'nationalism' was flexible enough to permit communalists to not only claim but also to sincerely believe that theirs was a truly nationalist rather than a sectarian group. Matters were further complicated by the late 19th century religious revivalism, especially within Hinduism. With the advent of this new 'improved' variety of religious identity, it did not seem so self- evident as it had before that one had to choose between religion and spirituality on the one hand, and the ideals of modernism and science on the other. In the contest between communal and non-communal political formations, the burden of proof (to demonstrate moral or social superiority) was thus unequally distributed, usually falling more heavily on the 'secular' type of grouping. It is in this context that we have to examine the implication of communalism in the process of emergence of the Indian nation-space. Hindutva is not a word but a history. Hindutva, or 'Hindu ness' is not to be confused with Hinduism, which is a sectarian' term, referring to the followers of the Hindu religion proper. Hindutva. On the other hand, includes members of other faiths (like Sikhism, Budhism, or Jainism). The territorial test for defining a 'Hindu' is based on the claim to a sacred geography. Theorists of human territoriality have suggested that it consists of three main things: a form of classification, a mode of communication, and a method of enforcing control. So Hindutva can be seen as a very successful model of territoriality that includes all three features. In the case of Hindutva this boundary also acts as the means of legitimising power and control of the nation-space, given its social context .

1.5 NEHRUVIAN WELFARE STATE

As recognized by many scholars, the main stream of the Indian national movement led by the Congress included a broad spectrum of tendencies that based themselves on implicit or explicit appeals to Hindu religion. These ranged from the militantly communal stance of a Tilak to the much more complex but nevertheless recognizably Hindu approach of Gandhi. Indeed as Nehru noted in his autobiography the explicitly secular tendency within the Congress was a relatively weak one. The assassination of Mahatma Gandhi by Nathuram Godse, and the latter's links with the RSS provided the secular forces with a big stick with which to beat communalists. The stigma of being associated with the Mahatma's killer was so strong that it took more than a decade for the Hindu right to regain sufficient legitimacy to make a mark in national level politics. Similarly the sudden death of Sardar Vallabbhai Patel in 1950 left the communal right within the Congress leaderless, and paved the way for the emergence of Nehru as the undisputed leader of the party. Moreover Nehru's vote-drawing abilities and charisma

helped to personalize his power and enabled him to play a critical but larger role in the immediate post-independence period.

So the 'golden age' of secularism did not mean that communal forces were non-existent. Nehru believed that the legal guarantee of equality of citizenship regardless of religion, caste, creed or other social attributes would render communalism obsolete. It was only the colonial state that, by refusing to guarantee these freedoms, was helping to keep communalism alive in order to playoff one community against another. The Nehruvian era amply demonstrates the centrality of the economy for nationalism. The major spatial strategy of this era thus foregrounds the economy: The nation is figured primarily as an economic space. It is this economic geography that the post-independence generation has grown up. The celebrated dams and steel plants was the contribution of Nehruvian regime. The citizens of the nation were invited to see themselves reflected in the mirror of technological progress and development, to identify themselves as fellow travelers on the journey towards this common goal.

This spatial vision of Hindutva is remarkably inclusive. The nation was visualized as a community of patriotic producers. The other side of the inclusiveness of the Nehruvian nation-space was an elitism that operated in an universalistic mode. The Nehruvian era created and privileged a pan-Indian elite that could- by and large, forget their regional moorings. Not only did this elite seem to be "placeless", it also appeared to be caste-less' and 'class-less' a truly secular, modem elite. This elite spoke in the modernist idiom of secular nationalism, scientific technology, and economic development.

1.6 PARTY SYSTEM CONGRUENCE

In some federations, issues, parties and voting behaviour at the center and provincial levels are closely integrated, while in others, the state and federal electoral arenas appear to operate much more independently of each other. The degree of integration of party systems in Indian union, as indicated by party system congruence, is an important dimension of politics in a multi-level setting. The presence of party systems in a federation which vary a great deal in terms of the parties that compete, and patterns of aggregate voter behavior. Party system congruence, or similarity, on the other hand, may reflect a competitive environment in which issues, parties, and voter behavior at the state level are linked to the federal level. The allocation of resources between the federal and state levels of government is a key institutional variable explaining the congruence or similarity of party systems. It affects the incentives voters and party-face, and opportunities for cleavage mobilization.[5] Voter behaviour, indicated by the degree of variation of electoral support for parties across units of the Indian Union and the similarity of swings in support between the state and Center, is most responsive to the allocation of resources. Party system structure is less responsive to this institutional variable.   Party system incongruence occurs when the structural features of the party system, such as the number of parties, differ. Incongruence occurs in its starkest form when different parties compete at the state and central level. We can measure the congruence of party systems in terms of the uniformity of electoral support for parties

across the state and center. Centralization and decentralization yield relative party system congruence and incongruence respectively. [6]

Decentralization process does matter. The party systems are most congruent in centralized federations, and least congruent in decentralized. Decentralization of power in India is a key variable for explaining the development of different provinces. First, decentralization makes the state level an increasingly important site of competition. This can affect the cognitive orientations of voters—whether they take their cues from the center when they vote in state elections, or whether they base their assessments on state governmental performance. Voters respond to the location of power in a general sense by directing their political demands to the most effective arena. Decentralization also affects the orientations of parties. The institutional allocation of power at the center serves as a better explanatory variable for party system congruence than social cleavage or political culture explanations. Variations in policy priorities across constituent units of the union affect the potential for differential mobilization of issues, and hence incongruent vote swings.[i] Mobilization and politicization of issues also depends upon political leadership, as well as on political opposition.

The institutional division of power between the Center and state levels is a key variable capable of explaining cross-national variations in party system congruence. The institutional environment influences the strategic behaviour of both parties and voters. Decentralization of resources makes the state arena a relatively more important site for voters to direct their demands to and for parties to respond to. Decentralization also increases the policy weight of the state electoral arenas, making them fertile ground for the mobilization of local issues and the evolution of local priorities.

1.7 COMMUNALISM IN INDIA

Let us observe the specificity of recent communal politics in the context of 'economic liberalisation and the growth of mass media. Several scholars had asserted the existence of connections between these phenomena. Hindu communalism did serve, at least for a while, instanced in the Ram Janma bhoomi movement, as an ideology reinforcing economic liberalisation and its accompanying consumerist ethos. There was no necessary connection between their narratives. But their shared emphasis, on reawakening long dormant powers (whether of the market or of Hindutva) against: a corrupt state, and so helping the nation to come into its own was striking, as was the temporal proximity of these narratives' prominence. Nor could there be any mistake as to the enthusiasm for Hindutva on the part of the beneficiaries of liberalisation. or the willingness of Hindutva' s votaries to countenance this support. and indeed to seek it. The medium in which these narratives came together most spectacularly was electronic: the growth of mass media saw the spread of Hindu images as well as the message of consumption, and often these were brought together. There was an overlap between the narratives of communal and consumer identity formation: it was by apprehending the interpellation of the communal subject as a consuming subject that the extension and the mobility of communalism's appeal could be understood. If communalism was never an either/or matter, the proliferation of images which could be diversely entertained and

identified with dramatised the importance of engaging with the plurality of subject positions available in the field of communalised politics. More than accomplishing any merely mechanical function of transmission the electronic medium namely television, helped to straddle the dispersed and discrepant sectors of an unevenly developed society to bridge their diverse temporalities with the simultaneity of its broadcast image, and thereby simulate a unity to the nation in an unprecedented sense. It is histoticised at two levels: in terms of the crisis in hegemonising ideology and attempts by ruling classes to evolve a new conception of the collective project of the nation, and, more specifically, in terms of a shift in the Hindu right strategy. Previously, the main mode of mobilisation was by means of slow and patient work at the grass roots, symbolised by the daily drill of RSS shakhas. Political goals were long-term, and conceived in terms of influence rather than direct control. Owing to a number of developments, this approach changed to a direct bid for electoral power, with all the vagaries of support it entailed. This shift signals the ascendancy of the VHP over the RSS, at " least in respect to mobilisational mode, with; the retailing of Hindu identity by means of discrete commodified images and the exhortation of discrete acts of support from consumption to kar seva. In this way, the unity simulated by electronic capitalism helps inaugurate a new era in symbolic politics. It is in this context that the Ramjanmabhoomi movement has to be understood.

1.8 COMMUNALISM VRS ELECTRONIC CAPITALISM:

The growth of communalism is all too often firmly harnessed to one agency notably the BJP and its affiliates spotlighted as a threat to be understood and fought. The danger of such a view is that an entire set of phenomena tends to get reduced to the success or failure of a particular party. The wide variety of environmental factors enabling the rise of the party, its support by various social groups including many that were previously uncommitted, the communalisation of everyday life and practices, changes in the wider culture reflected in and resulting from its propaganda even in the absence of its decisive political victory. All of these factors tend to get ignored. The extent to which the ruling party colluded in the Ram temple movement is one of the more important of a series of relevant factors here. Such factors should force a rethinking of the 'usual suspects' approach to communalism, one that holds the Congress as the secular party of last resort. It is much more useful to think of the Hindu right as having not one, but two parties, the Congress and the BJP, operating gyroscopically to keep an upper-caste ruling alliance in power. That is to say, it is in the opposition of the two parties that space for the RSS /VHP is won, an opposition bounded and contained within a larger unity. This was succinctly expressed by Govind acharya in conversation: BJP minus RSS equals Congress. Extrapolating, RSS equals BJP minus Congress. Thus, the progress of the Ram temple movement could be accompanied by the appearance of political resistance at the center, even if this resistance was often perceived as Congress inertia or incompetence.

In attempting to situate and understand the recent phase of communalism, several writers have distinguished, very roughly, between the period of Nehruvian consensus, of a relatively secure Congress ideology of secular, autarkic developmentalism, and that which succeeded it; it is in the latter period that communalism has been on the ascendancy. In this phase, one which is yet to take full definition, there is a concerted

attempt to reduce the redistributive functions of the state and to render the market as the pre-eminent means of resource allocation. The increased reliance on the market and the concomitant dependence on foreign loans, reinforced by IMF-World Bank strictures, opens up domestic markets and 'globalizes' the economy in unprecedented ways. Together with the declared failure of state-led development and of the old Congress ideology, these changes make earlier modes of conceiving of the nation non-viable. It is in this context that the increased concern with national identity, and the political resort to Hindu or Hinduised definitions of national identity. such as the use of the 'Hindu-card' in electoral campaigns or the decision to serialise epics on national television. can best be understood.

The BJP critique of 'pseudo-secularism' presents a 'return to tradition', declaring Hindu nationalism as the answer to the failure of such programmes, in a sense. In commodified image systems, production and consumption are alienated from each other, so that consumers have no direct input into the production process. Although consumption is private, it is an act duplicated numerously and simultaneously, thereby allowing a social character to be imputed to it. Television secures the social time of viewers. A telecentric view would be one that regards the time of the image the effective level, and the one that matters, for instance as the stage of 'global capital' where value is delivered to its ultimate beneficiaries. A serial like the televised Ramayan was able to appeal across diverse social contexts provoking a range of understandings and significance but 'uniting' them in the event of the serial's transmission. The important of the telecast is hard to estimate, but then is no doubt that it was crucial.

1.9 CONCLUDING REMARKS

Globalisation is the world-wide movement for achieving instant economic growth through trade. It is accepted as India's economic policy in which market has become supreme. It has reduced the role of the public sector and governmental controls on private sector. With the processes of globalisation the concept of 'global village' and democracy as a form of 'good governance' is increasingly being viewed as procedurally the best way of arriving at decisions that not only take everyone's interest into account but are equally binding on them. As a result it is the democratic part of liberal democracy, ie a set of procedure and the representative institutions that is being more emphasised than its liberal component, i e, equality, freedom, tolerance and accountability. Among the most powerful competitors of hindutva for the status of major engine of contemporary social change is 'globalisation'. Broadly speaking, globalisation appears to pursue the contrary tendency; it tends to undermine the particularity of places and to subordinate them to a universalised logic. In spatial terms, this expresses itself in the process of deterritorialisation, that is, the uprooting and enforced 'portability' of all forms of social life that capital takes hold of. Industries turn nomadic in the search for the most profitable location; production processes are broken up and subcontracted globally; innovations in telecommunications enable certain industries (like computer software) to engage in 'space- less' production, i e, without a single, specific spatial location in the conventional sense. The basic outcome of such a conquest of space is a profound indifference towards its specificities. Thus, the spatial consequences of the economic logic of contemporary capitalism include the dilution of nation-specific production into a more anonymous

globalised process. The contemporary rise of Hindutva is more or less necessary by product of the process of globalisation. The two are also mutually contradictory. It is difficult to predict the future perspective. But it is useful to remember these two sets of relations-one complementary and the other is contradictory.

The promotion of Hindutva through the circuits of commodities has given communal politics much greater visibility and, thereby, access to a far wider public. The move to retailing Hindu identity has declared an intention to seek and build on far more partial forms of support with the explicit aim of securing political power. Liberalisation is proceeding with its reorganisation of public and private spaces in ways that are articulated to the Hindu right's political project but not necessarily identical with it. Attempts to revitalise capitalism itself demonstrate an eruption of the contradictions of community. Free and fair elections, freedom of speech and expression, and the rule of law and its protection to all are necessary, but by no means sufficient, conditions for a democracy to be meaningful. The best guardian of freedom of religion, and the most effective guarantor that unfair conversions are both the state and civil society. Secularism is the attitude of mutual toleration among the religious communities comprising the nation, and of neutrality or non-discrimination on the part of the state in its dealings with the citizens, irrespective of their religious identity.

Now there are three types of broad political formations that are competing for center stage in Indian politics. These are woven around support from among: (a) newly empowered intermediate caste(dalits, minorities etc mobilized on the ideological plank of securialism, pluarilism and multi culturalism , (b) upper caste Hindus and the upwardly mobile middle castes, the most backward castes and a section of dalits under the dispensation of Hindutva identity and (c) the third one mobilizing the voters around its somewhat outdated political ideology of nation building. Rawlsian legacy has been ignored in more economically backward countries like India. Confronted by the dichotomy of modern secularism versus religious revivalism, Indian communitarians today have taken refuge in the Rawlsian overlapping consensus as a plausible ways out. The party system incongruence prevails in India when social cleavages correspond with territorial boundaries. The institutional account represents an important corrective to social cleavages and conflicts because it creates differential incentives to mobilize the pre-existing divisions at the central and state level. In fact caste-class cleavages would not exist at all in a perfectly competitive market with complete information. Classes occur only where there are the kinds of market imperfections that create rents that is captured by some groups of actors and not others. There should be erosion of social cleavages through the adoption of consociational democracies rather than adversarial politics in India.

FOOT NOTES:

1. It was strongly felt, among other leaders by Gandhi, that missionaries were taking undue advantage of the poverty and illiteracy of the masses.

2. Multiculturalism encourages racial and ethnic harmony and cross-cultural understanding, and discourages hatred, discrimination and violence.

3. Lipset and Rokkan, 1967

4 . The unskilled manual labourers are more left in terms of attitudes and voting compared to those of managers.

5 The party systems are least congruent in decentralized federations and most congruent in centralized federations.

6. Switzerland has an extremely high degree of incongruence, clearly influenced by more than its degree of decentralization. US is the highly decentralized federation, yet has relatively congruent party systems on this measure.

REFERENCES

Basu, Shamita (2002): Religious Revivalism as Nationalist Discourse, Oxford University Press, New Delhi.

Chandran, Sudhir(2002): 'An Unresolved Dilemma: Gandhi on Religious Conversion' in Sudhir Chandra, Continuing Dilemmas: Undertanding Social Consciousness, Tulika, New Delhi.

Dunn, Richard S (1979): The Age of Religious Wars 1559-1715, Norton, New York.

Evans, G. (ed.) (1999) The End of Class Politics? Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fleishman, J.A. (1988) "Attitude organization in the general public: the role of core beliefs and attitudes," American Journal of Political Science, 32:416-440.

Gallanter, Marc (1989): Law and Society in India, Oxford University Press, New Delhi.

Gerald J Larson, (2001)(ed), Religion and Personal Law in Secular India. Social Science Press, New Delhi.

Green, D.P. and B. Palmquist (1994) "How stable is Party Identification?" Political Behavior, 43:437-66.

Huntington, Samuel (1996): The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, Touchstone, New York.

Inglehart, Ronald. 1997 Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Jenkins, R. (1996) Social Identity. London: Routledge.

Jones, Kenneth W (1976): Arya Dharm: Hindu Consciousness in 19th Century Punjab, Manohar, New Delhi.

Lambert, R.D. and J.E. Curtis (1993) "Perceived Party Choice and Class Voting," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 26:273-85.

Lipset, S. M. and S. Rokkan (1967) "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," In S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross -National Perspectives. New York: The Free Press.

Neto, O. A. And G.W. Cox (1997) "Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of Parties," American Journal of Political Science, 41:149-74.