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Intellectual Property Rights and Preferential Trade Agreements: Data, Concepts and Research Avenues

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Today, more than half of international trade is regulated through preferential trade agreements (PTAs). While in the past, these agreements served as tools to eliminate further tariffs between the parties, today we witness the increasing inclusion of trade-related provisions such as Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) protection, competition clauses or behind-the-border regulation. This paper maps the variation of IPR provisions using three different concepts: the degree of IPR protection, IPR enforcement and multilateral coherence. In addition, it explores who are the main advocates of IPR protection and how successful are their approaches to embed IPR protection in PTAs?

This paper presents novel fine grained data which captures the variation in the design of IPRs in 661 PTAs building on the DESTA database (www.designoftradeagreements.org). We review the literature and provide a descriptive look at the new dataset and outline future research avenues.

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Intellectual Property Rights and Preferential Trade Agreements: Data, Concepts and Research Avenues

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1. Introduction

Intellectual property rights (IPRs) and trade agreements go a long way back. But it was not before the conclusion of the multilateral negotiations that created the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its covered agreements, when IPRs made the news. The WTO devoted a specific agreement on IPRs embedded in a larger market access philosophy and back by a dispute settlement system with teeth: The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Trade experts saw the TRIPS agreement as one of the main outcomes and pillars of the new organization. The protection of IPRs, however, was heavily contested both during the negotiations and in the aftermath of the WTO creation. In this particular regulatory area, least-developed countries (LDCs) have been granted a transitional opt-out from the treaty obligations, a flexibility provision which has been prolonged to at least 2021. Criticism, however, was also voiced by a number of emerging economies that lamented an overtly strict IPR regime. In 2001 the Doha Declaration to launch a new trade round (the Doha Development Agenda) could only be adopted by consensus after heated debates and difficult negotiations to allow the TRIPS agreement to be derogated for national public health objectives.

The protection of IPRs has remained a contested matter in recent years. Civil society groups, in particular in Europe, have been campaigning against too stringent protection. They pushed for the European Parliament to block the ratification of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) in 2012 by an overwhelming majority (478 to 39 with 165 abstentions). This ended (for now) the project of a plurilateral agreement among some of the leading exporters of patent and trademark protected products. The most recent mega-regional trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) which has been strongly advocated by the US, move toward higher levels of protection granted for trademarks, copy rights and other areas of IPR, building heavily on ACTA and US IPR law.

This paper takes a systematic approach to IPRs in trade agreements and aims to take stock of IPR-related provisions in preferential trade agreements (PTAs). For this purpose, we first discuss the literature

regarding the role of IPRs before providing new descriptive statistics on their inclusion in trade agreements. Based on the DESTA database (Dür et al. 2014), we present our conceptualization of IPR content in PTAs and provide the most systematic mapping done so far. The data shows in particular that agreements with participation of the US and North-South agreement are the most ambitious, feature specific enforcement mechanisms, but are also strongly tied to the multilateral IP regime. This confirms largely conventional wisdom. The paper ends with outlining the next steps of this research project.

2. Debates on IPRs and Trade Agreements

The economic literature on the role of stringent IPRs in attracting trade, investment and technology is far from conclusive (Fink and Maskus 2005; Maskus 2005). As a consequence, the need for including IPRs in trade agreements is also contested (see Maskus 2000). Nevertheless, international treaties to protect IPRs in foreign markets have been around for a long time. The 19th century witnessed the elaboration and conclusion of a set of specific bilateral and plurilateral agreements to protect copyright, artistic work, etc. These agreements later in the 20th century were bundled and administrated by the World Intellectual Property Rights Organization (WIPO) through a multilateral setting (see Cottier et al. 2015). The adherents to these treaties were mainly industrialized countries at the time.

The debate increasingly politicized when IPR protection became a prominent feature in trade agreements in the late 1980s, illustrated by significant IPR obligations in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) treaty. But more importantly, IPRs moved center stage in the multilateral trading system in the context of the Uruguay Round leading to the TRIPS agreement. The debate on the optimal balance protecting legitimate concerns by the holder of IPR rights and allowing for ongoing innovation was outstripped by developing countries contesting the concept of IPR, while developed countries seeing IPRs as a necessary condition for foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology transfer. Developed countries finally accepted the inclusion of IPRs as part of a grand bargain which provided opportunities for better market access in textiles and agricultural goods (Ostry 2002).

One of the effects of the creation of the WTO and its strong dispute settlement system was the growing importance of WIPO agreements by both transplanting legal language of IPR agreements into the TRIPS agreement and by making the accession to a number of WIPO treaties quasi mandatory. This led to a hardening of WIPO's soft law regime (see Shaffer and Pollack 2010) and a shifting of regulatory boundaries across international organizations (Dupont and Elsig, forthcoming). However, the original fears that the TRIPS agreement would lead to a flood of WTO disputes did not materialize (Pauwelyn 2010) and beyond the demands to clarify the relationship between public health and TRIPS, the politicization was less acute than anticipated during the late 1990s.

Today, IPRs have become an important feature of modern PTAs while the dialectical relationship between PTAs and the multilateral system remains strong. A unique element of the TRIPS agreement is the obligation for WTO members to grant concessions agreed in PTAs to all WTO members not just to those that participate in a given PTA. This so-called MFN clause ensures that non-PTA members can benefit from WTO+ types of protection for existing areas or new types of concessions. This clause provides the opportunity for an indirect multilateralization of preferential deals in the area of IPRs.

3. Existing Work on IPRs and Trade Agreements

Given the importance of IPRs and the growing reliance on trade deals through preferential arrangements, it is surprising how little systematic research has been conducted in this area. While numerous studies exist that look at IPRs in trade agreements, few of these take a systematic approach; most follow a legal descriptive approach. Some studies have zoomed in on one particular trade agreement and have either compared its design to TRIPS (see Maskus 1997; Kang and Stone 2003; Price 2003; Roffe 2004) or focused on a specific IPR issue such as public health within a PTA (see Correa 2004a). Other contributions have compared IPRs across multiple PTAs selecting one country or one region (see Abbott 2006; Heath and Kamperman Sanders 2007; Lindstrom 2010; Fink 2011). Still others examine a specific issue area such as technical assistance in PTAs (see Roffe et al. 2007) or analyze IPRs in Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) without accounting for corresponding commitments in PTAs (see Drahos 2001; Correa 2004b; Bernieri 2006; Boie 2010).

Seuba (2013) has prepared one of the most comprehensive studies and analyzed the intellectual property content of 141 PTAs. His case selection was based on the WTO's Regional Trade Agreements Information-System (RTA-IS) and include only PTAs, which have some form of IPR protection. The paper provides an overview of the occurrence of IPRs in PTAs, looks at the development over time, compares treaties between the different types of pairs of countries (developed and developing countries), and differentiated areas of IPR enforcement and IPR categories.

Another ambitious project, both conceptually and descriptively, has been the result of work carried out by the WTO Secretariat (see Valdés and Tavengwa 2012 resp. Valdés and McCann 2014). The first version of the study analyses 194 and the second version 245 trade agreements notified to the WTO, both papers are based on the RTA-IS database as well. It contains an extensive dataset on general IPR content and scope of IPRs in PTAs understood as different forms of IPR areas such as copyrights, industrial designs or domain names. The study provides a highly descriptive and informative analysis of IPR content variables across different regions and time, and compares networks of trade agreements with IPR provisions over time.

Another strand of research that has been conducted aims at studying the origins of IPR design features. There is ample anecdotal evidence of negotiators engaging in copy-pasting. If we focus on TPP, for instance, we witness that much of the content has been drawn from other treaties. The IPR chapter of TPP incorporates the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, in which it emphasizes once more that TPP Parties can take measures to protect public health. The same chapter then borrows heavily from the failed ACTA treaty on counterfeit goods to address the challenges of trafficking in counterfeit trademark goods and pirated copyright goods. Finally, some elements are new, such as the use IPR enforcement against infringement in newly regulated areas such as the digital environment, including products and services.

Some work has been carried out to study this phenomenon more systematically. Allee et al. (2016) show in their work on how much WTO is present in PTAs that also in the area of IPRs exists significant presence. Over 60% of IPR chapters in PTAs make references to the WTO and these references are overwhelmingly designed to build coherence with the TRIPS agreement. In addition, on average for each

PTA more than 10% of text is lifted directly from the TRIPS agreement. Also in separate work on how PTAs borrow from other PTAs, Allee and Elsig (2015a) show that on average 77% of a PTA's IPR chapter copies from its most similar PTA that was concluded in the past, suggesting substantial copy-pasting and close connection to the WTO treaty system.

So although the topic of IPRs in PTAs has attracted some attention in the field of IR, there are few studies that study the phenomenon systematically. Most studies take a descriptive, legal approach and speculate about the policy implications. Another restriction of previous research on IPRs in PTAs has often been the limited number of cases and time periods analyzed, or the predominant focus on specific countries and actors (very popular being the European Union and the United States). Our paper tries to fill this apparent gap and work towards presenting the most extensive design data on IPRs and offer some preliminary findings on design variation.

4. Conceptualizing and Measuring IPR Provisions

The literature on international institutions and agreements has developed different design concepts (Koremenos et al. 2001, Abbott et al. 2000) ranging from the obligation of agreements to questions of delegation and control, as well as flexibility features and enforcement. This rich literature has inspired a set of studies on trade agreements on which we draw in elaborating our conceptualization and measurement (Kucik and Reinhardt 2008, Pelc 2009, Johns 2014, Rosendorff 2005, Baccini et al. forthcoming, Allee and Elsig 2015b).

The first concept, which we call DEGREE OF IPR PROTECTION, captures the overall IPR content and obligations that are included in a treaty (see Valdes and Tavengwa 2012; Valdes and McCann 2014). We code eleven variables in a binary fashion. In order to be coded as 1, the identified IPR type needs more than just mentioning or reference, but specific obligations have to be included. We do at this stage not define this variable in relation to WTO commitments (WTO plus or WTO minus). Currently, we propose a simple aggregate index ranging from 0 to 11. Table 1 lists the components that go into this measure:

Table 1: Degree of IPR Protection - Index

#	Variable Name	Coding Question
1	Copyrights, Related Rights	Does the IPR definition/chapter include specific commitments on copyrights and/or related rights?
2	Trademarks	Does the IPR definition/chapter include specific commitments on trademarks?
3	Geographical Indications	Does the IPR definition/chapter include specific commitments on geographical indications?
4	Industrial Designs	Does the IPR definition/chapter include specific commitments on industrial design?
5	Patents	Does the IPR definition/chapter include specific commitments on patents?
6	Undisclosed Information	Does the IPR definition/chapter include specific commitments on undisclosed information (including knowhow)?

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7	Layout Designs of Integrated Circuits	Does the IPR definition/chapter include specific commitments on layout-designs (topographies) of integrated circuits?
8	New Plant Varieties	Does the IPR definition/chapter include specific commitments on new plant varieties?
9	Traditional Knowledge, Genetic Resources	Does the IPR definition/chapter include specific commitments on traditional knowledge and/or genetic resources?
10	Encrypted Program-Carrying Satellite Signals	Does the IPR definition/chapter include specific commitments on encrypted program-carrying satellite signals?
11	Domain Names	Does the IPR definition/chapter include specific commitments on domain names?

From the literature, we know that the overall ambition of a treaty needs to be analyzed in connection with the availability and strength of enforcement tools (Downs et al. 1996, Allee and Elsig 2015b). Therefore, we introduce as second concept of IPR ENFORCEMENT. This measure is a composite variable focusing on 11 indicators that all individually provide greater enforcement possibilities. These refer to the availability of dispute settlement mechanisms, direct border measures that can help combat the infringement of rights, the existence of administrative and/or criminal procedures, special liability for service providers as well as the institutionalization (e.g. through joint Committees) to help and enforce and provide more transparency. Table 2 lists the components that make up this measure.

Table 2: IPR Enforcement - Index

#	Variable Name	Coding Question
1	General Enforcement Statement	Is there a general statement of IPRs enforcement?
2	Dispute Settlement Mechanism	Is there a dispute settlement mechanism directly related to IPRs?
3	Implementation Provision	Is there a general statement of IPRs implementation?
4	Border Measures	Is there a general statement of border measures related to IPRs?
5	Special Requirements Related to Border Measures	Are there special requirements related to border measures for the enforcement of IPRs?
6	Civil, Administrative Procedures, Remedies	Are there any civil and administrative procedures and remedies defined for the enforcement of IPRs?
7	Provisional Measures	Are there any provisional measures defined for the enforcement of IPRs?
8	Criminal Procedures, Remedies	Are there any criminal procedures and remedies defined for the enforcement of IPRs?
9	Service Provider Liability	Is there a service provider liability defined for the enforcement of IPRs?
10	IPR Committee	Is there an IPR Committee monitoring implementation/enforcement/administration of IPRs?
11	Transparency	Is there a statement of Transparency defined to ensure the enforcement of IPR protection?


As a third concept we suggest looking at is how much the IPR obligations are embedded in the larger network of WTO and WIPO rules and regulations. We call this variable MULTILATERAL COHERENCE. The

more IPR obligations in PTAs incorporate multilateral principals and norms and advocate the adherence to established IPR treaties, the less fragmentation is created which would allow forum-shopping between treaty venues. We propose two distinct measures for coherence. The first measure COHERENCE 1 works with four indicators: First, whether national treatment and MFN (both core WTO principles) are explicitly granted to the PTA partners as the MFN clause further strengthens the existing MFN obligation for WTO parties; second, whether a re-affirmation of the TRIPS agreement is found; third, whether a reaffirmation of the core WIPO Convention is found; fourth, whether one or more reference to WIPO treaties is included. The second measure COHERENCE 2 captures the anchoring of IPRs in a broader network of IPR-related multilateral treaties in more detail by coding 28 IPR-related treaties that have been open for ratification. In appendix A, we list the treaties with year of creation. This index is an aggregate index ranging from 0 to 28.

5. Mapping IPR Provisions

In this section we present and discuss data related to our three prime categories (degree of protection, enforcement, multilateral coherence).

Figure 1: Coverage Over Time



Before discussing the patterns of IPR design in these areas, figure 1 above shows when IPR contents started to appear in PTAs and when specific commitments start to increase. Until 1985 we find no IPR-related content in PTAs. The first trade agreement including IPR was the FTA between Israel and the United States that was signed and entered into force in 1985. It contained one Article on IPR, which granted national treatment as well as MFN treatment and mentioned patents, copyrights, trademarks and industrial design in particular but didn't include any specific obligations (degree of protection). After this, IPRs are increasingly included in PTAs, both general statements (from 35% in the early 1990s to 80% in the past few years). The percentage of including specific provision beyond the mere declaration starts

to increase in particular the past 5 years (from around 30% to 75%). This suggests that especially in the past 10 years more and more IPR content is covered in PTAs.

If we focus on the types of IPRs that have been subject to inclusion into PTAs (figure 2), we find that copyrights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial design and patents to be the dominating types of IPR rights. More recently and less often we find references to new plant varieties, traditional knowledge or domain names. So the PTAs map pretty closely onto WTO obligations on the first group of rights.

Figure 2: Types of IPR Coverage






Figure 3: IPR Protection and Membership Characteristics



Turning to our first concept that measures the degree of obligation, figure 3 above shows the average degree of IPR protection across membership characteristics. If we focus on regions, Americas has the highest amount of IPR protection compared to other regions. Intra-European PTAs and intra-Asian PTAs have substantially lower protection, while African PTAs lack IPR protection. Intercontinental agreements are generally more recent and also show higher levels of IPR protection. Not surprisingly North-South agreements are those much higher IPR protection than both North-North and South-South treaties. This pattern is suggestive that North partners in PTAs push for greater legal certainty about IPR protection and make it (analogous to the WTO Uruguay Round negotiations) a condition for greater market access. The data also shows that PTAs including the US have the greatest obligation in terms of IPRs by far. The EU compared as well as the group of leading economies (the G20) have significantly lower IPR content.

When we take a closer look at the US, the EU and the G20 (figure 4), we observe that in the case of the US WTO established IPRs make the bulk of specific commitments (copyright, trademarks, geographical indications and patents) but also newer areas such as encrypted program-carrying satellite signals and internet domain names. For both G20 and the EU there is less variation across issue areas.

Figure 4: IPR Protection: G20, US and EU Compared



Our second concept focuses on the strength of enforcement of IPR rights in PTAs. As most dispute settlement mechanisms of PTAs have much less “teeth” than the WTO’s dispute settlement system, we focus in particular on elements in PTAs that provide a stronger enforcement push for IPR rights and that can work in combination with the existing dispute settlement procedures. Figure 5 provides an overview. Enforcement is on average rather moderate for PTAs concluded in the Americas, Asia and Europe and nearly absent in African PTAs due to the lack of specific commitments. In particular, that Asian attention to enforcement is slightly higher than for other regions is surprising, but mirrors general PTA dispute settlement design (Allee and Elsig 2015b) questioning longstanding debates about the non-legal Asian way to solve disputes. Similar to the level of protection, north-south agreements have significantly higher enforcement capacities. Finally, PTAs including the US exhibit strong enforcement elements.

Figure 5: IPR Enforcement and Membership Characteristics





Figure 6: IPR Enforcement: G20, US and EU Compared




In terms of the elements that drive the high level of US enforcement, Figure 6 plots the different sub-parts of the index. PTAs with the US involved have high levels on all the dimensions with the exception of creating specific Committees to oversee the process. This lack of “institutionalization” looks puzzling. In the US case also we witness much higher levels on civil administrative procedures and criminal procedures as well as direct border measures.

Subsequently, we focus on our third index which measures the degree to which PTAs make references to both the WTO and the WIPO IPR regimes. We see these strong signals as an attempt to avoid fragmentation and incoherence. Figure 7 shows that intercontinental and European agreements are

those with the highest inclusion of WTO principles and re-affirmations of WTO and WIPO regimes (general multilateral coherence measure). In terms of the direct inclusion of IP-related treaties to be acceded it is noteworthy that intra-European PTAs are more likely to include these than American, Asian and African treaties. Very significant again are the differences when we focus on North-South agreements in relation to the other categories. Finally, PTAs involving the US involve more commitment both for general and specific coherence with the multilateral system than PTAs involving the EU or G20 countries.


Figure 7: Multilateral Coherence and Membership Characteristics



Finally, we look at the development of the different indexes over time. As shown in figure 8 all indexes show a clear increase over time. For the degree of protection we can see that beginning in the period 2005-2009 on average at least one specific IPR obligation (1.2) was included per PTA. The IPR enforcement index shows that already 5 years earlier (2000-2004) an average PTA already included at least one provision on enforcement (1.4). Looking at the multilateral coherence we see that beginning in 2000-2004 average PTAs included at least some form of general coherence provisions (Coherence 1, 1.3) and included already in 1990-1994 reaffirmation or accession provisions to at least one IPR-related multilateral agreement (Coherence 2, 1.0).¹

¹ The three indexes are not directly comparable as the number and types of components differ, we will standardize this in the next iteration of the paper.

Figure 8: Coverage Over Time - Indexes



6. Discussion and Next Steps

This paper maps selected IPR provisions in PTAs, presents three concepts and discusses some descriptive statistics with respect to PTA membership characteristics. It shows that treaties involving the US have higher protection of IPRs, stronger enforcement tools but at the same are also closely aligned to the multilateral IP regime. Similarly, North-South agreements score higher on these three indexes, confirming the general argument on the potential function of IPRs in attempting to attract investments and technology while protecting innovation mostly created in the more developed partners to a PTA.

In the next iteration of the paper, we will engage in a multivariate analysis to better account for the presented patterns and variation in this paper. We will estimate models for each of three IPR dimensions accounting for the fact that institutional design features interact. We will analyze the variation of design by focusing on a set of explanatory variables prevalent in the literature. We posit that the higher the exports to the other market, the combined market power and the IP-content of exports, the greater the level of protection sought in PTAs. Similarly, we expect enforcement to be following similar patterns. In respect to the question of multilateral embeddedness, we will test whether this is a function of how satisfied PTA partners are with the multilateral system and whether PTA partners belong to the creators of both key WIPO and WTO treaties in this field. In addition, we expect a causal link between the experience with the WTO dispute settlement system and the degree to which embeddedness is pushed.

Another avenue of research consists of gaining more insights into how design features travel from past agreements, bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral ones. Also domestic law in IP protection has inspired international law-making, so we will focus on how the dominating national legal practices have been

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transplanted. The diffusion literature provides us with theoretical guidance and will locate causal drivers of exports and imports of design.

Finally, with these data at hand, we might be able to better address some questions related to the impact of PTA obligations; most of the work in the past has used dummy variables on IPR presence in PTAs to estimate trade and investment effects. Given more nuanced data, we might inform this debate further and address both economic and political-institutional effects.

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Appendix A

#	Coding Question	Treaty Description	Classification
1	Does the treaty affirm (accession) to the Rome Convention?	International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations (1961)	WIPO IP Protection Agreements
2	Does the treaty affirm (accession) to the Paris Convention?	Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (as amended on September 28, 1979)	WIPO IP Protection Agreements
3	Does the treaty affirm (accession) to the Bern Convention?	Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (as amended on September 28, 1979)	WIPO IP Protection Agreements
4	Does the treaty affirm (accession) to the WCT?	WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) (1996)	WIPO IP Protection Agreements
5	Does the treaty affirm (accession) to the WPPT?	WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) (1996)	WIPO IP Protection Agreements
6	Does the treaty affirm (accession) to the Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms?	Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms (1971), Geneva	WIPO IP Protection Agreements
7	Does the treaty affirm (accession) to the Beijing Treaty?	Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances (2012)	WIPO IP Protection Agreements
8	Does the treaty affirm (accession) to the Singapore Treaty?	Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks (2006)	WIPO IP Protection Agreements
9	Does the treaty affirm (accession) to the TLT?	Trademark Law Treaty (TLT) (1994)	WIPO IP Protection Agreements
10	Does the treaty affirm (accession) to the PLT?	Patent Law Treaty (2000)	WIPO IP Protection Agreements
11	Does the treaty affirm (accession) to the Brussels Convention?	Brussels Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite (1974)	WIPO IP Protection Agreements
12	Does the treaty affirm (accession) to the Nairobi Treaty?	Nairobi Treaty on the Protection of the Olympic Symbol (1981)	WIPO IP Protection Agreements
13	Does the treaty affirm (accession) to the Budapest Treaty?	Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Micro-organisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure (as amended on September 26, 1980)	WIPO Global Protection System
14	Does the treaty affirm (accession) to the Hague Agreement?	Hague Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Industrial Designs (1925)	WIPO Global Protection System
15	Does the treaty affirm (accession) to the Lisbon Agreement?	Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their International Registration (as amended on September 28, 1979)	WIPO Global Protection System
16	Does the treaty affirm (accession) to the Madrid Agreement?	Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks (as amended on September 28, 1979)	WIPO Global Protection System
17	Does the treaty affirm (accession) to the Protocol of the Madrid Agreement?	Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks (as amended on November 12, 2007)	WIPO Global Protection System

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18	Does the treaty affirm (accession) to the PCT?	Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) (as modified on October 3, 2001)	WIPO Global Protection System
19	Does the treaty affirm (accession) to the Nice Agreement?	Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks (as amended on September 28, 1979)	WIPO Classification
20	Does the treaty affirm (accession) to the Strasbourg Agreement?	Strasbourg Agreement Concerning the International Patent Classification (as amended on September 28, 1979)	WIPO Classification
21	Does the treaty affirm (accession) to the Vienna Agreement?	Vienna Agreement Establishing an International Classification of the Figurative Elements of Marks (as amended on October 1, 1985)	WIPO Classification
22	Does the treaty affirm (accession) to the Locarno Agreement?	Locarno Agreement Establishing an International Classification for Industrial Designs (as amended on September 28, 1979)	WIPO Classification
23	Does the treaty affirm (accession) to the UPOV?	International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV)	Multilateral Agreements
24	Does the treaty affirm (accession) to the IPPC?	International Plant Protection Convention (1951)	Multilateral Agreements
25	Does the treaty affirm (accession) to the CBD?	Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) (1992)	Multilateral Agreements
26	Does the treaty affirm (accession) to the UCC (Geneva, 1952)?	Universal Copyright Convention of 6 September 1952, with Appendix Declaration relating to Article XVII and Resolution concerning Article XI, Geneva	Multilateral Agreements
27	Does the treaty affirm (accession) to the UCC (Paris, 1971)?	Universal Copyright Convention as revised on 24 July 1971, with Appendix Declaration relating to Article XVII and Resolution concerning Article XI, Paris	Multilateral Agreements
28	Does the treaty affirm (accession) to the UDRP?	Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (1999)	Multilateral Agreements