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RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS AND STOCK PRICE CRASH RISK: EVIDENCE FROM INDIA

Ekta Selarka Subhra Choudhury



MADRAS SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS

Gandhi Mandapam Road Chennai 600 025 India

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Ekta Selarka

Assistant Professor, Madras School of Economics ekta@mse.ac.in

Subhra Choudhury

subhra@mse.ac.in

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Gandhi Mandapam Road

Chennai 600 025

India

October 2015 Phone: 2230 0304/2230 0307/2235 2157

Fax: 2235 4847/2235 2155 Email: info@mse.ac.in

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Abstract

Related Party Transactions disclosures in Annual Reports have recently gained more attention of the Indian policymakers. This paper aims at finding out the effect of related party transactions disclosure on the stock price crash risk faced by the firms. Using a large sample of all the NSE listed firms for the period 2005-2012 this study provides evidence that related party disclosure decreases the stock price crash risk faced by the firms. This study is consistent with the view that information asymmetry increases crash risk. Related party transactions disclosure decreases information asymmetry in the market and thus reduces stock price crash risk. Moreover the study shows that the effect of disclosure about related party transactions is significantly more for higher risk firms.

Keywords: Related party transactions, Stock price crash risk, Ownership

structure, India

JEL Codes: *G12; G14; G32*

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Ekta Selarka Subhra Choudhury

INTRODUCTION

Stock price crash risk is an important concern for investors and regulators all over the world. Stock price crash risk is generally defined as the frequency of extreme negative stock returns. Stock returns are function of markets' expectation about future earnings of the firm. This in turn depends on the informativeness of stock prices, the extent to which value-relevant information about a firm is available to investors and can be incorporated into stock prices. In addition to taking measures to improve market efficiency and liquidity that accommodates the flow of information in the market, stock market regulators around the world have also focused upon higher information disclosure of publicly available information through regulated laws and highlighting voluntary best practices which can become norms in future course of time. Apart from the information about the earnings, acquisitions, board meetings etc, additional impetus has been given on the corporate transactions. More recently, the focus has been on the disclosures about Related Party transactions (RPT).

Related party transactions refer to the transactions between two parties who are connected by any special relationship. Such relationship may be that of a holding company and its subsidiary, companies belonging to same owners or ownership groups etc. Formal definitions of related parties, RPT, as according to the laws have been given in the following section. Related Party transactions are very normal feature of commerce and business. Business entities are often required to carry out certain parts of their operations through their subsidiaries, joint ventures and associates. In many cases such transactions may be inevitable, useful, and recurring in ongoing operations. However, several scandals like Enron, Parmalat, Satayam Computer Services have cited RPTs to be detrimental to outside shareholders. RPTs are often known to cause conflicts of interest between the company, its executive officers and the shareholders. It may be used by the companies to "tunnel" resources out

of the company to its related party. These will detriment the welfare of the share holder. Again it may be used to "propel" resources from the related parties. In many cases, the manager or the Executives of the companies are provided with equities of the company. It is done as a measure to control shirking by the managers. However in such a scenario, even if the company is not doing well, the executive directors and managers can use related party transactions to draw funds from the associated enterprises to cover up the true position of the company and to prevent a fall in the share prices of the company. So, share prices will remain high even though the company has no true productivity or asset to back for it. This creates a bubble in the share price of the particular company and generates a risk for stock price crash. Other related party transactions may include the unnecessary use of company resources by the company executives for their personal benefits. This is also detrimental to the welfare of the share holder.

However, all related party transactions are not illegal and detrimental to the welfare of the shareholder. Some related party transactions are necessary for proper functioning of the company and are carried out at competitive terms i.e. at "arm's length". RPTs done at arm's length can reduce transaction costs and further increase the profitability of the company thereby increasing the overall value to the shareholders.

Related Party disclosures increases publicly available information about the firm in the market. This reduces information asymmetry in the market, and thus helps the equity market to function effectively. It also increases investors' confidence on the company. These in turn reduce the crash risk faced by the enterprise.

Firms across the globe use RPT to transfer income and assets across their related parties. Studies have shown that firms in developed countries also use RPT as a means to transfer out income and assets for

the benefit of those who control them (Johnson et. al., 2000). However, RPT is more prevalent among the group firms. Concentrated ownership and business groups are popular among the emerging countries. Researchers have found that almost 70 percent of listed companies East Asian economies are group affiliated (Claessens, Fan, and Lang, 2002). Such group ownership structure increases the scope for RPT due to the inter-linked ownership structure that creates the internal capital market for the affiliates. India, also has concentrated ownership structure. A major portion of companies and businesses are owned by large business groups and are family owned. These businesses can use their pyramidal structures to conduct related party transactions to inflate or deflate their profits in order to evade taxation, to manipulate their earnings either upward or downwards, to decrease shareholder return, or simply to maximize the individual benefit of the executive officers. Withholding RPT information increases information asymmetry in the market. This decreases transparency in the market. This in turn adversely affects the efficiency of the equity market and increases the crash risk, as elaborated in the previous section. When this type of activity is under taken by a large number of firms it will have cascading effect on the equity market as a whole

One of the recent accounting frauds in Indian corporate sector (Satyam Computers) led to the mandatory RPT disclosures in the corporate governance report. In 2008 Satyam's board chaired by the promoter Mr. B. Ramalinga Raju put forward a proposal to buy a company Maytas, which was owned by relatives of the Satyam promoter. This deal was further called off due to resistance from the investors. Following the disapproval, on January 7, 2009 Mr. Raju resigned from the chairmanship and confessed about fudging the accounts of the company of over Rs. 7800 crore. Profits, cash flows and income for the firm were inflated. To justify this, the company had to carry additional amount of resources and assets. To fill this gap the decision to buy Maytas was taken. Following this event Mr. Raju and other CEOs were arrested and

51 percent stake of the company was auctioned. This case study shows how RPT can be used by firms to manipulate earnings. Such activities when carried out in large scale, without proper disclosure will effect investors' confidence and increase crash risk. This link between information disclosure and crash risk motivates us to investigate if the stock price crash risk faced by firms can be explained by RPT disclosure keeping all other things constant.

The primary objective of this paper is to investigate the relationship between related part transactions and stock price crash risk of Indian firms. Specifically, contributions of our study are as follows:

- ✓ To analyze whether stock price crash risk can be explained with the related party transactions disclosures and if such disclosures can effectively reduce stock price crash risk, in a concentrated ownership structure
- ✓ To analyze whether the effect of related party disclosures on stock price crash risk varies across different quantiles of risk.

This paper is organized as follows. Next section provides an elaborate discussion about the regulatory framework to present the definition of the related parties, transactions covered under RPT and laws governing such parties and transactions in India. Section three reviews the empirical literature on the related party transactions and stock price informativeness to build our hypotheses. Section four describes the data and methodologies that we use to analyze the empirical question. Section five presents the empirical findings and section follows concludes our study.

RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS: THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

Definition of Related Parties

An appropriate definition of related party is very important to start with. There exist several ambiguities in the definition of the term itself. According to the **Accounting Standard 18 (AS 18)** parties are considered to be related if at any time during the reporting period one party has the ability to control the other party or exercise significant influence over the other party in making financial and/or operating decisions.

According to AS 18 related parties include:

- two or more enterprises that are controlled by or are under common control.
- two or more parties who invested in a joint venture
- individuals who directly or indirectly have voting power in the enterprise and hence have significant control or influence over the enterprise; and relatives of such individuals
- key management personnel and their relatives
- enterprises that have some common directors, major share holder or member of management.

With an intention to remove differences among different accounting aspects and to bring about standardization the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA), India On February 25, 2011, notified **the Indian Accounting Standard (Ind As 24)**, which was more or less in line with <u>International Financial Reporting Standards</u> (<u>IFRS</u>). However, the date of its implementation is yet to be notified. These laws are mentioned in Appendix box 2.

Related Party Transactions

Transactions between the related parties defined above are known as related party transactions. Such transactions can be of the following types:

- transactions that involves the sale or purchase of goods and services
- transactions involving sale or purchase of property and/or assets
- transactions involving lease of property and/or assets

- transactions involving provision or receipt of services or leases
- transactions involving transfer of intangible items (e.g. research and development, trademarks, license agreements)
- transactions involving provision, receipt, or guarantee of financial services (including loans and deposit services)
- transactions involving the assumption of financial/operating obligations
- transactions involving the subscription for debt/equity issuances
- transactions involving the establishment of joint-venture entities

Laws and Regulations in India

Over the last decades, related party transactions have gained more importance in the Indian economy. There had been several amendments in the related regulations, some of which are:

- 1. The Companies Act, 1956
- 2. Indian Accounting Standard 18
- 3. Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement
- 4. Companies Act, 2013

The Companies Act, 1956

The Companies Act, 1956 has governed Indian companies. Prior to the amendment in 1999, it had provided limits on investment by a company in other corporate bodies, whether in the same group or outside the group (Sections 372 and 370). Similar limits were applied to intercorporate loans as well as loans that could be advanced to companies in the same group. After a special resolution is passed in the general meeting, central government approval was required for loans exceeding this limit (Ramaiya, 1988). This law was amended and Section 372A was introduced. This provision now applies to include inter-corporate loans deposits, investments, guarantees, and securities in connection with loans to another public body corporate. Any transactions beyond the specified limits need approval by the annual general meeting through a special resolution. This does not apply for the loans given to any

individual firm, trust, or mutual fund. It also mentions about penalty if this is violated. Section 299 of the Act requires the disclosure of interest by a director in a board meeting in case the director is interested in any contract that the company is proposing to enter into.

Indian Accounting Standard 18

The Indian Accounting Standard 18 (Ind AS 18) covers the disclosure requirement of RPTs. Detailed definition of related parties under Ind AS18 is given in Box 1 of Appendix. There is no specific format for reporting RPTs under AS18. It gives a provision for aggregating the transactions that are less than 10 percent of the monetary value of the total transactions of the same nature. The requirement of disclosure includes:

- name of the related parties involved in transactions;
- description of the relationship between the involved parties;
- description of the nature of transactions between them;
- volume of the transactions done either as an amount or as an appropriate proportion
- any other necessary elements of related party transactions or an understanding of the financial statements; and
- Amount or appropriate proportions of outstanding items.

Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee Report and Clause 49

In early 1999 a committee was set up under the leadership of Mr. Kumar Mangalam Birla, which focused on promoting and raising the standards of good corporate governance in India. In the year 2000, stock market regulator, Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) accepted the key recommendations of Birla committee and incorporated these into Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement of the Stock Exchanges. Clause 49 requires a company to disclose materially significant related party transactions that may have potential conflict with the interests of company at large, this may include transactions of material nature, with

the promoters, the directors or the management, subsidiaries of the company or relatives etc.

Companies Act, 2013

The Companies Act 2013, brought about some changes in provisions for related party transactions. However, most of the provisions under Section 188 of 2013 Act are quite similar to the requirements under sections 297 and 314 of the 1956 Act. Some of the important changes as in the 2013 Act include the following:

- Need for central government approval for loans exceeding the permissible limit was removed.
- It widened the list of transactions such as leasing of property of any kind, appointment of any agent for purchase and sale of goods, material, services or property.
- Cash at prevailing market price was replaced with 'arm's length transaction'.
- Related party transactions has to be included in the board's report along with justification for entering into such contracts and arrangements.

Other than these, The Income Tax Act 1961 also contains provisions related to transfer pricing issues on related party transactions.

International Laws and Peer Comparison

International Accounting Standard, IAS 24, of IFRS was issued at 1st January 2012 under. This gives the international definition of Related Party transactions and lays down norms for related party disclosures, from an international perspective. It defines a related party transaction as "a transfer of resources, services or obligations between a reporting entity and a related party, regardless of whether a price is charged".

Any entity involving in any related party transactions during periods covered by the financial statements is required to disclose about nature of the related party relationship. At a minimum level, disclosures shall include amount of transactions and outstanding balances inclusive of commitments. Terms and condition of the transactions, details of any guarantees received or given, provision of doubtful debts and the expenses with respect of doubtful debts. Disclosures should be done separately for "the parent, entities with joint control or significant influence over the entity, subsidiaries, associates, joint ventures in which the entity is a venture, key management personnel of the entity or its parent and other related parties".

Next a peer comparison is conducted across countries where regulation requires disclosure of RPT. This also includes a brief study of the history of RPT laws in country, corporate ownership structure in the country, definition RPT as per the norms and RPT disclosure laws of the country. This section summarizes the peer comparison. The detailed comparison has been provided in Appendix.

All of the countries studied, i.e. China, Brazil, Belgium, Italy, Israel, Korea, South Africa have more or less concentrated ownership structure, France and South Africa being the ones with lower extent of concentrated ownership structure. China has a different ownership structure with a major participation of the state. In Korea the term "Chaebol" is commonly used to refer to conglomerates consisting of many related companies, including a number of companies listed on the stock exchange, which are engaged in a broad range of industrial and service businesses. Most chaebol have highly centralized, autocratic management under the founder and his immediate family members. This type of ownership structure enhances the existence of related party transactions between the controlling shareholders or related companies either directly or through company groups.

Most of these countries, like Belgium, France, Italy, Israel, Brazil, Russia, South Africa follows IFRS i.e. IAS 24 for their definition of Related Parties and disclosure norms. China diverges somewhat from the IFRS because of its different ownership structure. China does consider the transactions between state owned enterprises as Related Party Transactions. However there are some minor differences across the countries. For example, Belgium applies IAS 24 rules on the consolidated accounts. The French legal system makes a distinction between "related party transactions" which are accounted for and reported according to IAS 24 standards within the context of consolidated company group specific approval process called "conventions" and a réglementées" (literally this can be translated "regulated as agreements"). Brazil requires disclosure according to IAS 24 both in the consolidated and individual account. In South Africa, it has been expanded beyond IAS 24 to include related-party transactions with jointly controlled entities, and to include related-party transactions where both parties are controlled by the state. Other countries like Chile and Korea does not follow IAS 24. Chile's Companies Law states that a listed company can only undertake a Related Party Transaction (RPT) if the transaction complements the company's social interest, is conducted according to market practices, and is disclosed to and approved by the majority of the board. Most of the countries have a threshold limit. Any related party transaction above that limit is considered to be material and it must be disclosed.

At present, Indian Accounting Standards does not follow IFRS. However, with the Ind IAS 24, India is also trying to converge with the international norms

LITERATURE REVIEW

We review the existing literature across two different segments. First, the framework that is based on agency problem in corporate governance

issues and other factors that may lead to related party transactions. Second, the studies finding determinants of stock price crash risk. Separation of ownership and control are known to cause agency problem due to asymmetric information, unobservable efforts of the managers (moral hazard), and the managers' ability to take self-serving actions (such as appropriating funds for over consumption of perquisites, empire building) at the expense of the dispersed shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Corporate governance issues, like those with related party transactions, arise because of asymmetric information problems between external capital markets and the firms' managers. If external capital markets are able to perfectly observe the managers investment actions and effort, there would be no need for corporate governance mechanisms to help monitor the manager.

In Asian economies including India, concentrated ownership and control is the rule rather than the exception. Under concentrated ownership and control, the nature of the agency problem is essentially different from that present in diffused ownership structures. While in the latter, agency problems arise on account of shareholder manager conflicts, dubbed in the literature as Type I or vertical agency problems, in the former, agency problems arise primarily due to conflicts between the two categories of principals—the controlling inside shareholders and dispersed minority outside shareholders, dubbed as Type II or horizontal agency problems (Roe, 2004). Type I agency problems are likely to be alleviated under concentrated ownership and control as the incentives of controlling shareholders to monitor management would be stronger on account of their substantial stakes in the corporation. This, however, does not preclude Type II agency problems, of the incentives of controlling shareholders from seeking to extract and optimise private benefits for themselves at the expense of the minority shareholders (Morck and Yeung, 2004).

Related Party Transactions can be looked upon from two different perspectives – efficient contracting and agency theory. First, related party transactions can be a component of the overall formal or informal compensation package. Such transactions can substitute for cash-based compensation to officers and directors, or provide more liquid compensation to officers and directors when executives have high stock option levels. This provides financial incentives for insiders to enter into RP transactions. Secondly, RP transactions raise concerns based on agency theory. Agency theory suggests that managers will over consume perquisites. This over-consumption damages the stakeholders' value (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Holmstrom, 1979, 1982). Related party transactions that favor the related party to the firm's detriment represent examples of perquisite consumption (i.e. inappropriate wealth transfers). RP transactions can also alter the reliability of financial statements thereby reducing the effectiveness of contracts designed to reduce agency conflicts which in turn results into a lower firm valuation (Kohlbeck and Mayhew, 2004).

Within a group ownership setting, related party transactions, can be an upward manipulation of the earnings of the troubled firms in a group, by diverting away cash and profits from other group members. Such an effect should result into reduced profitability in general. Indeed, RPTs have found to negatively affect the company's operating performance measured by return on assets of Indian companies (Srinivasan, Padmini 2013).

Agency perspective provides a background to understand the role of information asymmetry and crash risk. To enjoy private benefits, managers have an incentive to withhold bad news for extended periods which leads to higher future stock price crash risk. With regard to the stock price crash risk, agency perspective of corporate tax avoidance is positively associated with the firm specific stock price crash risk (Kim, et. al. 2011). Using the sample of US firms, Kim et al (2011) finds that

presence of external monitoring mechanisms reduce the positive effect of tax avoidance on crash risk. A wide range of incentives, such as compensation contracts, career concerns, and empire building, motivate managers to conceal adverse operating outcomes (Ball, 2009; Kothari et. al., 2009). If a firm's manager withholds and accumulates negative information for an extended period, the firm's share price will be severely overvalued, thereby creating a bubble. When the accumulated negative information a tipping point, it will be suddenly released to the stock market, all at once, resulting in reaches the bubble bursting and a stock price crash (Hutton et. al., 2009; Jin and Myers, 2006). More importantly, hiding negative information about a firm prevents investors and the board of directors from taking timely corrective actions or liquidating bad projects early. As a result, unprofitable projects are kept alive for too long and their poor performance accumulates over time, until an asset price crash occurs (Bleck and Liu, 2007). Using earnings management as a measure of opacity, Hutton et al (2009) find that opaque firms which reveal less information are more prone to stock price crashes. Consistent with these conjectures, recent research shows that the lack of information transparency increases future crash risk by enabling managers to hide and accumulate bad news (Hutton et. al., 2009; Jin and Myers, 2006; Kim et al, 2010).

Market can comprehend information related to managerial incentive to extract private benefits and react in the form of crash risk. For example, excess perks are positively correlated with crash risk in Chinese SOEs (Nianhang et al 2014). The authors argue that to enjoy more perks, executives will try to build up their empire by pretending to have valuable investment opportunities, which is, in turn, masked by presenting the firm's good performance. The aforementioned diversions of firm resources incentivize executives to withhold bad news for extended periods. Bad news hoarding eventually reaches a tipping point and leads to a stock price crash. However, strong external monitoring makes it harder for executives to withhold bad news from investors and,

in turn, can mitigate the impact of excess perk consumption on crash risk.

Taking the evidence together, we hypothesize that the empirical nature of association between related party transactions and stock price crash risk in Indian context which is institutionally different from other emerging markets due to dominance of owner-managers in corporate sector.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

To provide systematic evidence on the association between related party transactions disclosures and crash risk we use a sample of all 1757 firms listed on National Stock Exhange (NSE) during 2014. The time period for study is 2005 to 2012. We collect information on ownership structure, stock prices and financial variables for these firms from Prowess database maintained by Center for Monitoring Indian Economy. After excluding missing observations on variables, we are left with 1564 companies. Related party transactions is available for different types of related parties i.e. Subsidiaries, holding company, parties where control exists, Key personnel and their relatives, and others. Under each category there were four main transactions namely Capital account payments and receipts, and total revenue income and expenditure. Total value of all these categories is considered as total RPT for our analyses. Table 1 shows the frequency of disclosure of RPT in our sample firms.

The testable hypotheses are defined as follows:

H1: Related Party Disclosures Decrease the Crash Risk Faced by the Companies

This prediction of negative relation is based on the fact that disclosure of related party transactions decreases the information asymmetry in the market, which is one of the factor responsible for elevating the crash risk

faced by a company and hence it decreases the crash risk faced by the company.

H2: Related Party Disclosures Decrease the Crash Risk for the Companies with Higher Crash Risk

Effect of RPT disclosure on risk may not be same for all level of risk. Acceptance of this hypothesis implies that companies with higher risk can decrease their risk by disclosing the related party transactions. Companies with low crash risk have low information asymmetry and high investor confidence. For such companies disclosure may not have any effect. However, for companies with high crash risk have high information asymmetry disclosure of RPT reduces information asymmetry and decreases risk.

Table1: Number of Listed Firms and Number of Firms Disclosing

RPT Over Years

Fiscal Year	No. of Firms	Firms Disclosing RPT
2005	1112	167
2006	1187	163
2007	1314	171
2008	1376	181
2009	1405	184
2010	1486	186
2011	1542	195
2012	1564	195

Further we define the measures of crash risk in terms of two measures as follows.

The Negative Conditional Return Skewness (NCSKEW) Measure (Chen *et. al.* 2001):NCSKEW for a given firm in a fiscal year is calculated by taking the negative of the third moment of firm-specific weekly

returns for each sample year and dividing it by the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns raised to the third power.

Specifically, for each firm j in year t, we compute NCSKEW as

$$NCSKEW_{j,t} = -\frac{\left[n(n-1)^{\frac{3}{2}}\sum R_{jt}^{3}\right]}{\left[(n-1)(n-2)\left(\sum R_{jt}^{2}\right)^{\frac{3}{2}}\right]}$$

The Down-to-up Volatility (DUVOL): This computed as follows: For any stock i over a particular year t; we separate all the days with returns below the period mean ("down" days) from those with returns above the period mean ("up" days), and compute the standard deviation for each of these subsamples separately. We then take the log of the ratio of (the sample analog to) the standard deviation on the down days to (the sample analog to) the standard deviation on the up days. Thus we have

$$DUVOL_{j,t} = \log \left\{ \frac{\left[(n_U - 1) \sum_{DOWN} R_{j,t}^2 \right]}{\left[(n_d - 1) \sum_{UP} R_{j,t}^2 \right]} \right\}$$

Where R_{jt} represents the sequence of de-meaned daily returns to stock j during period t; and n is the number of observations on daily returns during the period, $n_U and \ n_d$ are number of days when the price moved up and down respectively. In both the cases a higher value indicates a greater crash risk.

To check for the $\mathbf{H1}$ we check for the following regression equation:

$$Risk_t = a_0 + a_1RPT_{t-1} + \sum_{q=2}^{m} a_q \text{ (qth control variable}_{t-1}) + \epsilon_t$$
 (1)

Here $\mathsf{RPT}_{\mathsf{t-1}}$ is a dummy variable. It takes 1 if the company have disclosed RPT, zero otherwise.

We also run a logistic regression to see how amount of RPT disclosed affects the probability of facing a crash risk.

$$\begin{split} & \text{Log}(\text{odds of having a stock crash})_t = \\ & \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{LnRPT}_{t-1} + \sum_{q=2}^m \alpha_q \; (\text{qth control variable}_{t-1}) + \epsilon_t \end{split} \tag{2}$$

For $\mathbf{H2}$ we run quantile regressions for the equation (1) at different quantiles.

The set of control variables includes SIGMA_{t-1}, RET_{t-1}, SIZE_{t-1}, LEV_{t-1}, ROA_{t-1}, PROM_{t-1} and MBVR_{t-1}. The variable SIGMA_{t-1} is the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year period t - 1. Is gives the volatility of the stock. Stocks with higher risk are more volatile. The variable RET_{t-1} is defined as the arithmetic average of firmspecific weekly returns in year t - 1. The authors also document that stocks with high past returns are more likely to crash. The variable SIZE₁₋ ₁ is defined as the log of the market value of equity in year t - 1. Studies have given a positive relation between size and crash risk. The variable LEV_{t-1} is the total long-term debt divided by total assets. The variable ROA_{t-1} is defined as income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets. High leverage may result in higher risk and high operating performance may result in low risk. PROM_{t-1} is the promoter share holding ratio. MBVR_{t-1} is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity in year t - 1. Several studies have shown that growth stocks are more likely to experience future price crashes.

We also include group dummy variable that equals one if the firm belongs to business group and zero otherwise. Further, industry dummy variables are included to control for industry specific characteristics using National Industrial Classification (NIC) codes at two digit level. Firms in the sample are being classified into 21 industries. Finally year dummies for the eight years have been included.


EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Table 2 below shows the percentage of firms facing stock price crash risk (for both NCSKEW and DUVOL) across years. Here, the average value of NCSKEW is 20.9 and DUVOL is 18.4. This means, on an average, 20.9 percent (by NCSKEW measure) and 18.4 percent (by DUVOL measure) of firms face stock price crash risk. Crash risk reaches to its maxima at 2008, which corresponds to the great recession of 2008.

Table2: Firms Facing Crash Risk Over the Years

Fiscal Year	No. of Firms	Firms with Crash Risk		Percentage of Firms with Crash Risk		
		NCSKEW	DUVOL	NCSKEW	DUVOL	
2005	1112	110	83	9.9	7.5	
2006	1187	300	211	25.3	17.8	
2007	1314	132	105	10	8	
2008	1376	652	646	47.4	46.9	
2009	1405	180	141	12.8	10	
2010	1486	239	186	15.9	12.5	
2011	1542	405	418	26.3	27.1	
2012	1564	279	236	17.8	15.1	
Total	10986	2297	2026	20.9	18.4	

Figure 1: Crash Risk Over Years



CRASH RISK ACROSS OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES 0.2 0 2005 2006 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8 -1 -1.2 -1.4 Indian Firms Foreign Firms Indian Govt. And Cooperative Firms

Figure 2: Crash Risk Over Years For Different Ownership Structures

Figure 1 shows crash price risk of all the NSE listed firms across years and figure 2 shows the same according to the ownership categories. In 2008 crash risk faced by the firms increased. From figure 2 it can be seen that the foreign firms listed in NSE were more affected by the crisis.

Table 3: RPT_{t-1} (in Rs. Millions)

Fiscal Year	No. of Firms	Disclo sing	Percenta ge of firms disclosin g RPT	Mean	Standard Deviation	5 percent	_	Media n	_	95 percent
2005	1112	167	15.0	2120.6	9833.4	1.0	28.8	207.8	1223.8	8061.2
2006	1187	163	13.7	3156.7	13151.4	2.0	26.9	242.8	1376.2	10847.9
2007	1314	171	13.0	2417.7	14812.4	1.0	25.6	139.5	851.4	4614.3
2008	1376	181	13.2	2657.9	10772.7	1.0	22.7	178.2	1136.3	9848.9
2009	1405	184	13.1	3037.3	16457.2	1.0	16.8	185.1	1188.6	7909.6
2010	1486	186	12.5	4203.7	21959.1	1.0	21.8	213.6	1456.6	19029.7
2011	1542	195	12.6	4068.6	18727.7	1.0	18.5	206.2	1166.7	13490.5
2012	1564	195	12.5	5467.6	23418.4	1.0	37.4	327.0	2022.9	22618.7

Table 3 shows the percentage of firms disclosing RPT, across years. This percentage varies from 15 percent to 12 percent on an average. On an average only 13 percent firms disclose RPT.

Table 4: Risk and RRT_{t-1} (in Millions) Across Different Promoter Share Holding Categories

Share Holding Categories								
Promoter Share Holding Ratio	NCSKE W _T	DUVOLT	Total RPT _{T-1}	Holding Comp- anies	Subsi- diaries	Parties Where Control Exists	Key Personne I and Their Relatives	
less than 25 percent	-0.404	-0.278	226.531	19.402 (8.565 percent)	77.625 (34.267 percent)	128.073 (56.537 percent)	1.431 (0.632 percent)	
25 percent-50 percent	-0.452	-0.318	211.869	18.924 (8.932 percent)	35.672 (16.837 percent)	156.186 (73.718 percent)	1.088 (0.513 percent)	
50 percent-75 percent	-0.481	-0.328	600.468	177.897 (29.626 percent)	222.765 (37.099 percent)	196.909 (32.793 percent)	2.897 (0.483 percent)	
75 percent to 100 percent	-0.522	-0.350	866.735	276.449 (31.895 percent)	515.909 (59.523 percent)	69.257 (7.991 percent)	5.120 (0.591 percent)	

Table 4 shows the distribution of risk, total RPT, and RPT undertaken with different related parties. It can be seen that risk is lower for the firms with higher promoter share holding ratio. Firms where promoters hold more than 75 percent percent of the shares disclose the maximum amount of RPT. For firms with low promoter share holding ratios major portion of RPT disclosed is undertaken with Subsidiaries and Parties where control exists. Whereas in case of companies with higher promoter share holding ratios maximum transaction is with holding companies and Subsidiaries.

Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for all Variables

Variables	Mean	S.D.	5	25	Median	75	95
			percent	percent		percent	percent
Risk Measures							
$NCSKEW_T$	-0.478	1.025	-1.746	-0.940	-0.459	-0.074	0.594
DUVOLT	-0.324	0.427	-0.939	-0.588	-0.331	-0.084	0.295
RPT Measures	3442.115	17012.79	1.000	24.300	207.00	1223.80	10665.00
Total RPT _{T-1}							
Control Variables							
RET _{T-1}	0.000	0.005	-0.007	-0.002	0.000	0.002	0.005
SIGMA _{T-1}	0.035	0.012	0.019	0.028	0.034	0.041	0.053
ROA _{T-1}	0.910	0.898	0.062	0.384	0.790	1.228	2.188
LEV _{T-1}	0.430	1.690	0.010	0.144	0.315	0.474	0.794
SIZE _{T-1}	7.789	2.134	4.598	6.283	7.610	9.195	11.556
PROM _{T-1}	51.78119	17.87249	20.25	40.335	52.59	64.8	78.16
$MBVR_{T-1}$	2.252	15.883	0.118	0.665	1.304	2.627	7.346

Table 5 gives the descriptive statistic for all the variables i.e. for the dependant variable, for the main independent variable and for the control variables. The mean value for NCSKEW is -0.48 and for DUVOL is -0.32. This suggests that the sample studied is not crash prone on an average. The average value of total RPT transaction is Rs. 3442.115 Millions.

Table 6: Correlation Coefficients

	DUVOL	NCSKEW	RPT _{T-1}	RET _{T-1}	SIGMA _{T-}	ROA _{T-1}	LEV _{T-1}	SIZE _{T-}	PROM _{T-}	MBV
	т	т			1			1	1	R _{T-1}
DUVOLT	1									
NCSKEW	0.8553	1								
т										
RPT _{T-1}	-0.0075	-0.0137	1							
RET _{T-1}	0.1743	0.1401	0.009	1						
SIGMA _{T-1}	-0.0774	-0.0362	-0.1677	-0.0042	1					
ROA _{T-1}	-0.0341	-0.0213	0.0327	0.0665	-0.0316	1				
LEV _{T-1}	0.0259	0.02	-0.0339	-0.0145	0.0742	-0.06	1			
SIZE _{T-1}	0.0804	0.0512	0.2499	-0.1251	-0.4935	-	-0.1173	1		
						0.0791				
PROM _{T-1}	-0.0368	-0.0324	0.1151	0.0375	-0.079	0.1185	-0.07	0.1571	1	
MBVR _{T-1}	-0.0024	-0.0035	0.0357	0.0033	-0.0423	0.0285	-0.0134	0.1041	0.0365	1

Table 6 shows the correlation coefficients for all variables. Both the measures of risk, NCSKEW and DUVOL are highly correlated, with a correlation coefficient of 0.86. RPT is negatively related to both the crash risks, which is consistent with our predictions that PRT disclosure reduces future crash risk.

H1 predicts that RPT disclosure is negatively related to future stock price crash risk because it reduces information asymmetry in the market. Tables 7, 8 and 9 present the multivariate regression analyses for testing H1, with the full set of control variables. In each of these tables Model 1 uses NCSKEW as a risk measure, model 2 uses DUVOL and model 3 uses a cross measure of both NCSKEW and DUVOL. Model 3 considers a firm to be risky if and only if it is risky by both the measures. Table 7 and 8 uses a pooled regression set up. To alleviate concern about potential cross-sectional dependence in the data, we report t-values (z-values) on an adjusted basis, using robust standard errors corrected for industry clustering.

Table 7 reports a pooled regression with industry and year dummies. Here RPT measure is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the company discloses RPT else it is 0. For model 1 and 2 the coefficient of RPT is -0.084 and -0.034 respectively. This implies that on average, other things remaining constant, for firms disclosing RPT crash risk is lower than those not disclosing RPT by .084 (for NCSKEW) and .034 (DUVOL).

The sample contains firm—years from 2005 to 2012. The z-values (t-values) reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by industry. Industry and Year fixed effects are included.

Table 7: Effects of RPT Disclosure on Stock Price Crash Risk (Pooled)

	NCSKEW _T	DUVOL _T
RPT Measures		
RPT _{T-1}	-0.084***	-0.034**
	(-3.810)	(-2.350)
Control Variables		
RET _{T-1}	40.424***	21.641***
	(8.490)	(-3.81)
SIGMA _{T-1}	3.070***	1.397***
	(3.010)	(-3.27)
ROA _{T-1}	-0.005	-0.005
	(-0.200)	(-1.070)
LEV _{T-1}	0.058***	0.029**
	(2.850)	(-2.22)
SIZE _{T-1}	0.044***	0.023***
	(12.670)	-17.57
PROM _{T-1}	-0.002***	-0.001***
	(-3.910)	(-4.310)
MBVR _{T-1}	-0.001	0
	(-1.150)	(-1.260)
Intercept	-1.093***	-0.665***
	(-16.740)	(-28.020)
Ownership Dummy	Yes	YES
Industry Dummy	Yes	YES
Year Dummy	Yes	YES
R2	0.097	0.19

Note: Here *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Here a pooled OLS model has been used.

This table presents the results of the effects of RPT on stock price crash risk using a Logit model. The sample contains firm–years from 2005 to 2012 . The z-values (t-values) reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by industry. Industry and Year fixed effects are included..

Table 8: Effects of RPT Disclosure on Stock Price Crash Risk (Pooled Logit)

	NCSKEW _T	DUVOLT	BOTH NCSKEW _T
DDT M			AND DUVOL _T
RPT Measures	0.0224	0.045***	0.047***
RPT _{T-1}	-0.033*	-0.045***	-0.047***
	(-1.870)	(-4.820)	(-5.700)
Control Variables		***	
RET _{T-1}	65.394***	53.798 ^{***}	69.252***
	(13.960)	(-6.7)	(-14.16)
SIGMA _{T-1}	5.114*	5.371*	4.142
	(1.670)	(-1.72)	(-1.28)
ROA _{T-1}	-0.133***	-0.056*	-0.125***
	(-6.420)	(-1.630)	(-4.090)
LEV_{T-1}	0.170***	0.069	0.084*
	(2.960)	(-1.27)	(-1.79)
SIZE _{T-1}	0.152***	0.132* ^{**}	0.156***
	(20.200)	(-10.21)	(-13.1)
$PROM_{T-1}$	-0.004***	-0.005***	-0.005***
	(-3.660)	(-4.020)	(-4.190)
MBVR _{T-1}	0.000	0	0
· -	(0.000)	(-0.150)	(-0.250)
Intercept	-3.463* [*] *	-3.598***	-3.893***
·	(-18.020)	(-14.780)	(-14.280)
Ownership Dummy	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry Dummy	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Dummy	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo-R2	0.097	0.118	0.109
Marginal effect of RPT _{t-1}	<i>-0.0048*</i>	-0.0057***	<i>-0.0051***</i>
(at means)	(-1.83)	(-4.61)	(-5.15)

Note: Here *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.

This table presents the results of the effects of RPT on stock price crash risk (Logit model in a panel data frame work) The sample contains firm—years from 2005 to 2012. The z-values (t-values) reported in parentheses. Industry fixed effects are included. Here *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.

TABLE 9: Effects of RPT on Stock Price Crash Risk (Panel Logit)

	NCSKEW _T	DUVOL _T	BOTH NCSKEW _T AND DUVOL _T
RPT Measures			
RPT _{T-1}	-0.036**	-0.051***	-0.052***
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Control Variables	, ,	,	, ,
RET _{T-1}	86.574***	82.011***	91.045***
	(7.784)	(8.066)	(8.554)
SIGMA _{T-1}	-16.956***	-22.137***	-19.020***
	(3.246)	(3.479)	(3.684)
ROA _{T-1}	-0.133**	-0.077	-0.133**
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.058)
LEV _{T-1}	0.211***	0.095*	0.101**
	(0.069)	(0.049)	(0.049)
SIZE _{T-1}	0.141***	0.119***	0.146***
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.020)
PROM _{T-1}	-0.006***	-0.007***	-0.007***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
$MBVR_{T-1}$	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Intercept	-1.569***	-1.341***	-1.823***
	(0.239)	(0.246)	(0.260)
Ownership Dummy	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry Dummy	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marginal Effect of RPT _{t-1}	<i>-0.036*</i>	-0.051***	-0.052***
(at means)	(-2.24)	(-3.05)	(2.95)

Note: Here *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively

Tables 8 and 9 test the primary hypotheses using logistic regression. In both the cases RPT_{t-1} is the log of the total amount of PRT. Table 8 uses a pooled regression setup. Here, the coefficients of RPT_{t-1} are -0.033, -.045 and -0.047 for models 1, 2 and 3 respectively. This implies that disclosure of RPT is negatively related to stock price crash risk. To find out the economic significance of the results we computed the marginal effects. The marginal effect of RPT_{t-1} on crash risk is -0.48

percent, -0.57 percent and -0.51 percent respectively. All the marginal effects are also are significant. This implies that for every percentage increase in amount RPT disclosed probability of a firm facing a stock price crash decreases by the above percentages that is, by 0.5 percent on an average.

In the above regression setup we included year dummy and industry dummy variable to control for year and industry heterogeneity. However individual firm heterogeneity was not captured in the above model. So next in table 9, we used the same regression in a panel data frame work. Under this setup also the results were similar. Here the coefficients of RPT $_{t-1}$ are -0.036, -.051 and -0.052 respectively. This implies that disclosure of RPT is negatively related to stock price crash risk. The marginal effect of RPT $_{t-1}$ on NCSKEW, DUVOL and Both NCSKEW and DUVOL are -3.59 percent, -5.12 percent and -5.2 percent respectively. All the Marginal effects are significant. This implies that for every percentage increase in amount RPT disclosed probability of a firm facing a stock price crash decreases by the above percentages.

Given that on an average 20.9 percent (by NCSKEW measure) and 18.4 percent (by DUVOL measure) of listed firms in India faces crash risk, these results suggests that association between crash risk and RPT disclosure is important for the economy as a whole.

The coefficients of the control variables are generally consistent with the findings of prior studies. $PROM_{t-1}$ was negatively related to crash risk. This implies that promoter share holding in a particular firm signals the market about the firm. A firm with higher promoter share holding percentage gives a positive signal to the market. $SIGMA_{t-1}$, RET_{t-1} , $SIZE_{t-1}$, LEV_{t-1} have positive impact on the crash risk and ROA_{t-1} is negatively related. $MBVR_{t-1}$ was insignificant in all the cases.

H2 predicts that RPT disclosure reduces stock price crash risk for the high risk companies. Effect of RPT disclosure may not have the same effect for all the firms. Company where crash risk is very high indicates that information asymmetry is very high which implies that for such companies RPT disclosure reduces the information asymmetry in the market and hence reduces stock price crash risk. On the other hand, companies with lower crash risk have lower information asymmetry and therefore have higher investors' confidence. For such companies disclosure of RPT may not have any significant effect.

Table 10 presents the multivariate regression analyses for testing H2, with the full set of control variables. We use a quantile regression for this purpose. We estimate the relationship between RPT disclosure and crash risk at 5 percent, 10 percent, 25 percent, 50 percent, 75 percent, 90 percent and 95 percent quantiles of crash risk respectively. Industry and year dummies have been included to account for year and industry heterogeneity which may contribute to the crash risk of the stock irrespective of disclosure practices. RPT measure is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the company discloses RPT else it is 0. To assign firms in crash risk quantiles, DUVOL has been used as a measure of stock price crash risk. Regression coefficient for RPT variable was significant for 50 percent(-0.025), 75 percent (-0.045), 90 percent(-0.048) and 95 percent (-0.074) quantiles respectively. It is insignificant for the quantiles below 50 percent. This shows that PRT disclosure does not have the same effect on crash risk for all levels of risk, RPT disclosure reduces crash risk for the companies with very high crash risk. Also, it can be noted that the absolute value of the coefficient increases from 50 percent quantile to 95 percent quantile. This implies that impact of RPT disclosure on crash increases with the risk level of the company.

Table 10:_Effects of RPT on Stock Price Crash Risk

(Quantile Regression)

			itile iteg				
	95	90	75	50	25	10	5
	Quantile	Quantile	Quantile	Quantile	Quantile	Quantile	Quantile
<u>RPT</u>							
<u>Measures</u>							
RPT _{T-1}	-0.074***	-0.048**	-0.045***	-0.025**	-0.016	-0.021	0.009
	(-2.860)	(-2.400)	(-3.060)	(-1.990)	(-1.340)	(-1.230)	(0.360)
<u>Control</u>							
<u>Variables</u>							
RET _{T-1}	20.159***	15.893***	13.273***	13.637***		_	
	(3.580)	(5.100)	(7.890)	(11.070)	(11.410)	(7.740)	(2.680)
SIGMA _{T-1}	-0.691	1.368	2.105***	2.115***	1.501***	2.038***	2.132**
							*
	(-0.480)	(1.490)	(3.570)	(4.470)	(3.320)	(2.990)	(2.720)
ROA _{T-1}	-0.009	-0.006	-0.005	-0.008	-0.004	0.001	-0.006
	(-0.610)	(-0.530)	(-0.640)	(-1.150)	(-0.590)	(0.150)	(-0.500)
LEV _{T-1}	0.096***	0.071***	0.043***	0.013**	0.020***	0.021***	0.028**
	(0.040)	(0.550)	(6.170)	(2.100)	(2.050)	(2.650)	(2.600)
CIZE	(9.040)	(8.550)	(6.170)	(2.180)	(2.950)	(3.650)	(3.600)
SIZE _{T-1}	0.016***	0.018***	0.024***	0.028***	0.029***	0.030***	0.018**
	(2 540)	(3.910)	(7 560)	(11.460)	(12 200)	(0.000)	
PROM _{T-1}	(2.540) -0.001*	-0.001	(7.560) -0.001***	(11.460) -0.001***	(13.390) -0.001***	(9.990) -0.001***	(4.510)
FROMT-1	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.001**
							*
	(-1.760)	(-1.300)	(-3.100)	(-4.710)	(-4.290)	(-3.620)	(-2.880)
$MBVR_{T-1}$	0.000*	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000**	0.000***	-
11541411	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001**
	(1.710)	(1.420)	(0.010)	(-1.100)	(-2.100)	(-3.110)	(-2.260)
Intercept	-0.032	-0.321***	-0.539***	-0.719***	-0.889***	-1.048***	-
							1.073**
							*
	(-0.360)	(-5.110)	(-12.520)	(-19.890)	(-25.000)	(-20.300)	(-
	,	,	,		,	,	16.380)
Ownership	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dummy							
Industry	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dummy							
Year Dummy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo-R2	0.080	0.089	0.111	0.127	0.129	0.119	0.111

Note: Here *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.

This table presents the results of the effects of RPT disclosure on stock price crash risk for different quantiles of crash risk. The sample

contains firm—years from 2005 to 2012. The z-values (t-values) are reported in parentheses.

CONCLUSION

This paper investigates the effect of related party disclosure on the stock price crash risk using a sample of Indian firms during a period 2005-2012. Given the concentrated ownership structure which leads to higher information asymmetry our study contributes to the literature by examining the role of information disclosure of corporate transactions. Our findings show that related party disclosure decreases by the crash risk faced by the companies. The results obtained are robust to the use of different crash risk measures. The results are also robust to the different models and approaches used for the study. Overall our findings are consistent with the asymmetric information aspect of RPT disclosure. RPT disclosure reduces the information asymmetry in the market about a stock and thus reduces its crash risk.

Our analysis also shows that RPT disclosure reduces the crash risk for the companies with very high crash risk and has no significant effect fir the companies with low risk. The effect is greater for the higher risk companies.

The findings of our study can be used to justify the current regulatory requirements in Indian corporate sector that leads to reduce the overall crash risk of the stock market of the economy by emphasizing on mandatory disclosure of related party transactions and by imposing heavy penalty in case the companies do not abide by the disclosure norms. As the sample period used for the study was before the implementation of the Companies Act, 2013, which has given greater importance on mandatory disclosure of related party transactions, our findings provide a pre-Act status of effect of mandatory disclosures of RPT on the crash risk.

APPENDIX

Box 1: Related Parties under the Indian AS18

Indian AS 18 defines related parties as including:

- (a) enterprises that directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, control, or are controlled by, or are under common control with, the reporting enterprise (this includes holding companies, subsidiaries and fellow subsidiaries);
- (b) associates and joint ventures of the reporting enterprise and the investing party or venturer in respect of which the reporting enterprise is an associate or a joint venture;
- (c) individuals owning, directly or indirectly, an interest in the voting power of the reporting enterprise that gives them control or significant influence over the enterprise, and relatives of any such individual;
- (d) key management personnel and relatives of such personnel; and
- (e) enterprises over which any person described in (c) or (d) is able to exercise significant influence. This includes enterprises owned by directors or major shareholders of the reporting enterprise and enterprises that have a member of key management in common with the reporting enterprise.

Indian AS 18 explicitly excludes the following parties from related party status:

- (a) two companies simply because they have a director in common, notwithstanding paragraph 3(d) or (e) above (unless the director is able to affect the policies of both companies in their mutual dealings);
- (b) a single customer, supplier, franchiser, distributor, or general agent with whom an enterprise transacts a significant volume of business merely by virtue of the resulting economic dependence; and
- (c) the parties listed below, in the course of their normal dealings with an enterprise by virtue only of those dealings (although they may circumscribe the freedom of action of the enterprise or participate in its decision-making process):
- (i) providers of finance;
- (ii) trade unions;
- (iii) public utilities;
- (iv) government departments and government agencies including government sponsored bodies.

Box 2: Related Parties under the Ind As24

Related party is a person or entity that is related to the entity that is preparing its financial statements (in this Standard referred to as the 'reporting entity').

- (a) A person or a close member of that person's family is related to a reporting entity if that person:
 - (i) has control or joint control over the reporting entity;
 - (ii) has significant influence over the reporting entity; or
 - (iii) is a member of the key management personnel of the reporting entity or of a parent of the reporting entity.
- (b) An entity is related to a reporting entity if any of the following conditions applies:
- (i) The entity and the reporting entity are members of the same group (which means that each parent, subsidiary and fellow subsidiary is related to the others).
- (ii) One entity is an associate or joint venture of the other entity (or an associate or joint venture of a member of a group of which the other entity is a member).
- (iii) Both entities are joint ventures of the same third party.
- (iv)One entity is a joint venture of a third entity and the other entity is an associate of the third entity.
- (v) The entity is a post-employment benefit plan for the benefit of employees of either the reporting entity or an entity related to the reporting entity. If the reporting entity is itself such a plan, the sponsoring employers are also related to the reporting entity.
- (vi) The entity is controlled or jointly controlled by a person identified in (a).
- (vii) A person identified in (a)(i) has significant influence over the entity or is a member of the key management personnel of the entity (or of a parent of the entity).

Table A1: Comparative Study of Disclosure Laws Across Countries

				Across Countries
Countries \Details	History	Corporate Holding Structure	Definition of Related party and Related transactions	Disclosure Norms
China	After the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Communist Party of China's (CPC) National Congress in 1978 economic reform progressed in China's urban areas. The main objective was the revitalization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to make them more efficient by restructuring the old enterprise system. In 1993, focus was given to transform the SOE management mechanism and establish a system according to needs of a market economy, with clearly defined ownership,	China is characterized by concentrated ownership structure. Until 1978, most Chinese enterprises were stateowned, characterized by its administration-driven, unified and collective governance. After which the focus slowly shifted to establish a system according to needs of a market economy.	According to The Company Law related party relationship refers to the relationship between company's controlling shareholders, actual controllers, directors, executives and the enterprises it controls directly or indirectly, and other relationships which may influence the company's current share holding structure. However, state-owned holding enterprises are not considered to be in a related-party relationship merely because they are controlled by the state as well. In accordance with accounting standards, the following parties constitute related parties of an enterprise: (1) the parent company thereof; (2) the subsidiaries thereof; (3) other	Financial disclosure in China remains weak, this hamper the growth of capital markets. The government is beginning to tackle this problem by establishing procedures for voting and disclosure of related-party transactions as described above. Companies should also voluntarily and on a timely basis disclose information on independent directors' opinions on related-party transactions, and controlling shareholders' interests. Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China If any Written agreements is entered into for related party transactions among a listed company and its connected parties. Such agreements shall observe principles of equality, voluntarity, and making
	rights and responsibilities.		enterprises under the control of the	compensation for equal value. The contents of

With this view The Company Law. was introduced in December 1993. laid the foundation for China's corporate governance framework

In 2001, China joined the World Trade Organisation and undertook to adopt the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and improve corporate governance of Chinese listed companies. Corresponding to which The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the National Fconomic and Trade Commission jointly issued the Code of Corporate Governance of Listed Companies in early 2002. based on the OECD Corporate Governance This introduced the concept of related party

same parent company; (4) investors having enterprise: (5) the investors with significant influence upon the enterprise;

(6) joint ventures thereof: (7) the associated enterprises

thereof; (8) the main individual investors and the close family members thereof (9) key managerial

personnel refers to those who have the

power of and

responsibility for

planning, directing and controlling the activities of the enterprise. The close family members of a main individual investor or of a key managerial person refer to the family members who may influence or be influenced by that individual in handling transactions Disclosure of Related with the enterprise; (10) other enterprises significantly influence by the main individual investors, kev

such agreements shall be specific and concrete. Matters such as the joint control over the signing, amendment, termination and executio of such agreements shall be disclosed by the listed company in accordance with relevant regulations. Efficient measures shall be adopted by a listed company to prevent its connected parties from interfering with the operation of the company and damaging the company's interests by monopolizing purchase or sales channels. Related party transactions shall observe commercial principles. In principle, the prices for related party transactions shall not deviate from an independent third party's market price or charging standard. The company shall fully disclose the basis for pricing for related party transactions.

> Parties also require the affirmation of the connected parties.

managerial

personnel, or

members of such individuals

close family

transactions in	Related-party	
China.	transactions refer to	
	the transfer	
The <i>Company</i>	of resources or	
Law and the	obligations to and	
Securities Law,	from the listed	
2006, provide	company, its	
the foundation	subsidiaries and	
for drawing up	Related- party	
and developing	entities.	
a corporate		
governance		
framework in		
China.		
Crima.		
The issue of		
fund		
misappropriation		
by major		
shareholders		
and other		
related parties		
was a problem		
that seriously		
affected the		
healthy		
development of		
listed		
companies. To		
address it, the		
CSRC drafted		
regulations		
imposing a strict		
limitation on		
Fund		
misappropriation		
in listed		
companies by		
controlling		
shareholders		
and other		
related		
parties. It		
conducted pilot		
programmes on		
"shares for		
debt" and co-		
operated with		
local		
governments		
governments	I I	

	and other			
	relevant			
	agencies to deal			
	with the difficult			
	problem of debt			
	repayment			
	arrears. The			
	Criminal Law			
	was amended to			
	inflict greater			
	penalties on			
	major			
	shareholders			
	and			
	actual			
	controllers			
	involved in fund			
	misappropriation			
	of listed			
	companies.			
	pa			
Belgium	The Director's	Ownership of	The definition of	The Rozenblum doctrine
	charter 24 Jan	the listed	RPTs and Related	, under some
	2001,	company sector	Parties (RPs) is	circumstances , allows
	Mentions that it	are changing	according to the	directors to consider, the
	is the duty of	somewhat in	International	interest of the company
	the director to	recent years	Accounting	group as a whole rather
	avoid any	with large	Standards (IAS),	than just the company
	conflict of	shareholders	including IAS 24.	and the shareholders of
	interest between	reducing their	IAS 24 only	the company in which
	his direct	majority voting	applicable to	they are a member. In
	personal interest	bloc until	consolidated	the absence rules to
	and thpse of the	around 2007,	accounts together	offset it this could
1	company. He	after a new	with other IAS	weaken minority
	should be acting	takeover code	standards (e.g. IAS	protection.
	independently	established a	27 and IAS 31). The	
	without being	threshold of 30	Belgian accounting	In addition, the 2009,
	influenced by	per cent to	standards does not	Belgian Corporate
	the other	launch a	have any similar	Governance Code7
	shareholders.	mandatory	requirement but	(CGC) lays down several
	His works	takeover offer.	Article 524 of the	rules about managing
	should be in		Company Law forces	conflicts of interest
	favour of the		disclosure about	including with major
	company and all		some aspects of	shareholders.
	the shareholders		intra-company	Some of the changes
	and not for a		transactions. There	relating to Related Party
	particular group		is also a requirement	Transactions, in the
	of shareholders. This introduced		to disclose the	Companies Law 2002,
			company's policy	are:
	the flavor of	l .	towards dealing with	Article 523 prescribes

related party transactions without directly mentioning the term.

The conflicts of interest between board members and the company were addressed for the first time in the year 1995(Van Der Elst, p. 9) and then again to update **the** Company Law in 2002 when an approval procedure by independent directors for RPTs was introduced. The law recognises the duties of loyalty and care on the part of board members to the company and these are underpinned by the new Corporate Governance Code (CGC).

related companies and its directors and members of management that directors shall disclose their own conflicts of interest of a financial nature (including RPTs) to the board, to the auditors and to shareholders They may not take part in the deliberations or vote on conflicted transactions and the board's decisions in this respect must be minuted, reported to the external auditor and disclosed in the annual report. This also applies to executives who are members of the executive committee.

Article 524 mandates an approval procedure involving the board, independent directors and auditors as well as disclosure to shareholders of decisions and transactions of their company granting advantages to other companies of the same group, with the exception of the company's direct subsidiaries and the direct subsidiaries of the latter.

Disclosure Norms:

There are requirements to disclose the company's policy towards dealing with related companies and its directors and members of management. There are requirements to disclose details about RPTs and

				lagragially the t
				especially those can be categorized as material
				and not on market
				terms
				terris
France		The number of	The French legal	In case of any RPT, the
		companies	system makes a	interested party is legally
		belonging to	distinction between	required to inform the
		the groups is	"related party	board of directors about
		increasing. In	transactions" which	the considered
		the prevalence	are accounted for	transaction and he has
		of company	and reported	to abstain from voting
		groups, family	according to IAS 24	both within the board
		control and	standards within the	and at the shareholders
		large block	context of	meeting.
		shareholders in	consolidated	
		most listed	company group	Although the commercial
		companies,	accounts, and a	code requires that
		issues	specific approval	regulated RPTs are
		regarding regulation and	process called "conventions	subject to both board authorisation and ex
		prevention of	réglementées"	post shareholder
		related party	(literally this can be	approval involving all
		transactions	translated as	disinterested parties, but
		has recently	"regulated as	company executives do
		been attracting	agreements"). Listed	have legal authority to
		growing	companies must	enter into RPTs before
		attention.	follow some special	the board authorises
		Under French	procedures for	them, and if the board
		law, block	approval of	or shareholders vote
		shareholders	regulated RPTs	against such
		are also able to	based on the French	transactions, a court
		enhance their	commercial code.	action is still required to
			RPTs can be defined	nullify the agreement.
		company by	as " 'direct or	
			indirect agreements'	
		company	involving non-	
		charter double	recurring operations	
		3 3	and/or those done	
		registered	under abnormal	
		shares that	conditions between a	
		have been held by the same	company and its	
		shareholder for	CEO, a designee of the CEO, board	
		at least two	members or a	
		years.	shareholder with	
		years.	more than 10 per	
			cent of voting rights	
			in the company, or	
L	l .	l	in the company, of	I

with the company controlling that shareholder." This may include a wide range of transactions involving parties with a direct or indirect interest, including contracts between companies, remuneration of board members and management, retirement and severance packages such as golden parachutes, loans, rental agreements, etc., Italy The Italian Code of Corporate corporate Governance was first introduced in 1999 and later it was concentrated amended in control through 2006. It opaque corporate corporate corporate contained corporate shall act of Directors shall act of Di	tain oard
may include a wide range of transactions involving parties with a direct or indirect interest, including contracts between companies, remuneration of board members and management, retirement and severance packages such as golden parachutes, loans, rental agreements, etc., Italy The Italian Code of Corporate Governance was first introduced in 1999 and later it was concentrated amended in ownership 2002 and in 2002 and in control through 2006. It contained corporate with a direct or indirect interest, including contracts between companies, remuneration of board members and management, retirement and severance packages such as golden parachutes, loans, rental agreements, etc., According to The Article 9 of the com or explain Code cor the principle: "the principle: "the principle: "the principle: "the based on IAS 24. transactions in which will be additionable for on behalf or o	tain oard
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first introduced in 1999 and later it was amended in 2002 and in 2006. It contained corporate characterized by characterized by concentrated ownership control through corporate characterized by "related party" and "related par	
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2006. It opaque transaction" - A interest, on his/her contained corporate "related party"	h a
contained corporate "related party behalf or on behalf	an
provisions structural transaction" is any third parties and	of
וויסיוסיוס בייסיוסיוס בייסיוסיוסיוסיוסיוסיוסיוסיוסיוסיוסיוסיוסי	
regarding pyramids and transfer of transactions carried	out
directors' by dominance resources, services with related parties	are
interests and of a small or obligations performed in a	
transactions number of between related transparent manner	and
with related interlinked but parties regardless of meet criteria of	
parties (it was competitive whether or not substantial and	
the primary entrepreneurs consideration has procedural fairness'	. The
source of Under such been paid. The associated criteria s	
standards on circumstances following are "the board of direct	ors
this matter until protection of examples of shall, after consulting	g
Consob issued minority transactions which with the internal co	ntrol
its regulation in investors was would be considered committee, establis	1
2010). The weak. This was related party approval and	
revised Code of believed to transactions under implementation	
2006 went have led to the the New Regulation: procedures for the	
further in underdeveloped mergers or spin-offs transactions carried	out
defining best capital market. (by incorporation or by the issuer, or its	
practice so as to Complex strictly non-subsidiaries, with re	
clarify company proportional), carried parties. It shall defi	lated
procedures for groups have out with related particular, the spec	

	handling the	been under	parties;	transactions (or shall
	transactions.	pressure for	any transaction	determine the criteria for
		some time	which would lead to	identifying those
		through" Italian	granting of any type	transactions) which must
		discount". This	of economic benefit	be approved after
		led the	to any member of	consulting with the
		companies to	the Board of	internal control
		reduce their	Directors, the Board	committee and/or with
		structure.	of Statutory Auditors	the assistance of
		Italian company		independent experts".
		law and	personnel" of the	The internal control
		financial	company.	committee can also be
		regulation is		the audit committee.
		mainly focused		Furthermore, "the board
		on the issue of		of directors shall adopt
		company		operating solutions
		groups and		suitable to facilitate the
		shareholder protection for		identification and an adequate handling of
		quite some		those situations in which
		time.		a director is bearer of an
		unie.		interest on his/her behalf
				or on behalf of third
				parties"
Israel	ISA Adopted	Israel corporate	Israeli public	Special approval process
	Final Version	sector can be	companies are	is required under the
	of the Goshen	characterized	required to follow	Companies Law for the
	Report on	by highly	International	following_related party
	December 17,	concentrated	Financial Reporting	transactions. Some of
	2006. That	ownership and	Standard (IFRS)	these are mentioned
	recommended	prevalence	requirements,	below:
	focus on	pyramidal	including IAS 24.	Audit Audit
	improvement of director	company groups. This	Because IAS 24 defines related	Committee, Board and General Meeting
	independence,	creates risk in	parties as including	approval is required for
	regarding	enforcement of	parent companies	all extraordinary
	approval of	shareholder	and subsidiaries, and	transactions of a public
	related party	rights and	companies of the	company with a
	transactions and	equitable	same group (among	controlling shareholder
	some other	treatment. The	other related	or with another person
	aspects.	pyramidal	parties), intra-group	in which the controlling
	Companies can	structure in the	disclosures are	shareholder has a
	voluntarily	Israeli	treated under IAS 24	personal interest,
	elaborate its	corporate	as part of the	including a private
	decision not to	sector is quiet	disclosure of	placement; a contract
	adopt a given	complex and	consolidated	with the controlling
	corporate	diversified,	financial accounts.	shareholder or relative
	governance	containing a	•	for the provision of
	.Hence, the main protection	wide range of industries.		services to the company; if he is an officer in the
	main protection		10	ii ne is an onicei in the

extended to minority shareholders, for approval of corporate transactions with controlling shareholders in which conflicts of interest exists. This introduced the concept of related party transaction here.

Several large aroups include financial concerns such as banks and insurance companies at their lower levels. Reforms have curtailed banks' ability to play an active role in the pyramids, principally due to the fact that they have been limited in their investments in industrial companies and through company law restrictions on related party transactions

company, regarding the terms of his service and his employment; and if he is a company employee but not an officer, regarding his employment by the company.

 To obtain General Meeting approval, the transaction must attract the support of a majority of the votes of the shareholders who do not have a personal interest in the transaction and who are present and voting. The company itself has the responsibility for the classification of shareholders for such votes, but the Israel Securities Authorities (ISA) also checks ex poston whether shareholders have been correctly classified, particularly in cases where they judge that incorrect classification would have the potential to change the outcome of the vote. This "majority of the minority" provision was recently strengthened through Companies Law Amendment 16 to be increased from one-third of disinterested shareholders to a majority requirement. To reduce the risk of abuse by a small minority in cases where few disinterested shareholders are present

and voting, the law also
allows a measure to be
approved even without a
majority of the votes of
disinterested
shareholders of the level
of opposing votes among
these shareholders does
not exceed 2 per cent of
total voting rights
(increased from 1 per
cent under the same
amendment).
Other transactions
relating to employment
contracts and
remuneration, including
employment of company
officers, controlling
shareholders or their
relatives, are also
subject to RPT approval
processes but are not
the focus of this
particular review.
Company law states that
immediate reports must
be filed in the case of an
"extraordinary
transactions" (see
previous footnote for
definition) between a
public company and one
of its controlling
shareholders or another
interested party. The
transaction report: "must
include every detail
concerning the
transaction that may be
important to a
reasonable investor
for the purpose of voting
at the general meeting,
including, inter alia: a
description of the main
points of the transaction;
the name of the
controlling shareholder
who has a personal
42

			interest in the
			transaction; details of
			the rights that give him
			control in the company,
			including his proportional
			stake in voting rights;
			the nature of the
			personal interest; and
			approvals required or
			terms that were
			determined for carrying
			out the transaction. The report must also include
			the reasons of the audit
			committee and the
			board of directors for
			approving the
			transaction, the value of
			the consideration and
			the manner in which it
			was determined, and the
			reasons of the directors
			opposing it, if there were
			any, and the names of
			the directors who
			participated in the board
			and audit committee
			meetings with regard to the approval of the
			transaction, indicating
			who of these is an
			external director; the
			manner in which the
			consideration was
			determined and the
			name of each director
			who has a personal
			interest in the
			transaction and the
			nature of this interest
Chile	Chile is a	Related Transactions	
		include transactions	
	,	involving board	
		members	
		and their spouses or	
	market is	close relatives, as	
	characterized	well as transactions	
1		the contrator of the Contrator	
	by a high degree of	involving third companies	

		and the presence of companies identified with a relatively small number of entrepreneurial individuals and groups. Ownership of publicly traded corporations is highly concentrated, with the three largest shareholders often owning three-quarters	in which such board members perform as members of the board, or directly or indirectly control 10 percent or more of such companies. Chile's Companies Law states that a listed company can only undertake a Related Party Transaction (RPT) if the transaction complements the company's social interest, is conducted according to market practices, and is disclosed to and approved by the majority of the board. Transactions of less than 1 percent of the company's equity are not considered relevant, and therefore do not need to follow the above mentioned requirements.	
(CVM recommendation on Corporate governance, 2002 mentioned about related party	Companies are	The accounting standards for Brazilian public companies are fully converged to IFRs. So IAS24 was adopted for defining	Under the Brazilian regulation all the companies must disclosure RPT. Additionally, CVM requires the disclosure of information related to

	transactions in Functioning and Committees of The Board of Directors. And minority shareholder protection. Acccording to which "The board of directors should ensure that transactions among related parties are clearly reflected in the financial statements and were carried out in writing and under market conditions." IBGC 2004 and 2009 also mentioned about RPT.	listed companies is a very recent phenomenon and include a limited number of cases.	related parties and disclosing RPTs which is required for the consolidated financial statements as well as the individual ones.	RPT in the Reference Form (a form that all public companies have to fille at the website of the CVM on going basis).
Russia		in the hands of insiders, weak legal institutions that lead to high private benefits of control,	The Russian law considers a related-party transaction to be a transaction in which related parties are involved in the transaction in one of the following capacities: i)As a transacting party, a benifitiary, an intermediary, or an agent in the transaction, ii) As an owner of at least 20 percent of the voting shares (participatory shares, units) in a legal	Russian companies need to disclose information on transactions with related parties, in accordance with the criteria set forth by IFRS; information on material transactions of the company and legal entities controlled by it (including related transactions entered into by the company and one and/or more legal entities controlled by it);

		a segmented labor market, and significant involvement of the state in business.	entity that is a party, benefitiary, intermediary ar agent in the transaction; or iii) other instances as specified in the charter.	The 2013 code requires: In order to enable the shareholders and investors to make informed decisions, the company should disclose all material information about its activities, even if publication of such information is not required by law. The company should disclose information not only about itself but also about any legal entities which are controlled by and are material to the company.
South	The major South African instruments dealing with governance – the Companies Act, the King Code on corporate governance and the new listings requirements of the JSE – neglect the problems caused by related-party transactions other than those where directors are involved. The South African Institute of Chartered Accountants addressed the issue in 1999 by issuing a new addition to	South African companies possesses a relatively sound financial and regulatory structure reminiscent of developed markets, s as an emerging market, ownership of a firms is relatively concentrated	Parties are considered related where "One party has the ability to control the other party or exercise significant influence over the other party in making financial and operational decisions." The definition of related parties is further expanded to include individuals who have significant influence over either enterprise, their close family members and interests, as well as key management personnel, their close families, and interests	In addition, related-party relationships where control exists are to be disclosed irrespective of whether or not there has been a transaction. The accounting statement is based on International Accounting Standard (IAS) 24, and attests to the persuasive power within professional communities of international norms. The South African version has been expanded beyond IAS 24 to include related-party transactions with jointly controlled entities, and to include related-party transactions where both parties are controlled by the state

	1	ı		<u></u>
	GAAP			
	(Accounting			
	Statement 126)			
	that will require			
	disclosure of			
	related-party			
	transactions.			
Korea	Following the	In Korea the	Paragraph 1(8) of	r. The listing rules
	1997 financial	term " Chaebol"	Article 2 of the CITA	require companies to
	crisis, corporate	is commonly	recognizes "related	seek board approval for
	governance	used to refer to	parties" international	transactions exceeding 1
	reforms and	conglomerates	business transactions	percent of annual
	government-	consisting of	under	revenue or total asset
	initiated	many related	the following	value, and to report
	corporate	companies,	circumstances:	them to
	restructuring	including a	(Equity Ownership	shareholders at a
	were	number of	Test)	general shareholders'
	implemented in	companies	- where one	meeting. A set of
	Korea. However	listed on the	transaction party	transactions with a
	the Chaebols	stock	directly or indirectly	combined value
1	continued to	exchange,	owns 50 percent or	in excess of 5 percent of
1	oppose legal	which are	more the	annual revenue or total
	reforms	engaged in a	voting shares of the	asset value is also
1	designed to	broad range of industrial and	other transaction	subject to this
	increase	service	party; or, - where a third party	regulation.2 Outside of the listing
	accounting	businesses.	which directly or	rules, chaebols with
	transparency. The most	Most chaebol	indirectly owns 50	assets in excess of 2
	dramatic of	have highly	percent or more of	trillion won (US\$1.7
	these initiatives	centralized,	the voting	billion)
	were the "big	autocratic	shares of both	have a special
	deals"	management	transaction parties;	requirement, made
	announced by	by the founder	or	mandatory by the Korea
	the government	and his	(Substantial Control	Fair Trade Commission,
		immediate	Test)	for
	which	family	- where one	related transactions
	contemplated	,	transaction party	above 10 billion won
	mergers and	(until recently)	substantially controls	(US\$8.7 million) or 10
	business swaps	the creation of	the business policy	percent of book equity to
	between the	holding	of the	be
	largest chaebol.	companies was	other transaction	approved by the board
		not allowed,	party or vice versa,	and disclosed to the
	The commercial	each chaebol	and both transaction	public. 3
	code	group was	parties share the	In any case, no prior
	New intra-group	controlled by	same interest by	shareholder
	guarantees have	the founder	reason of capital	approval of related-party
	been prohibited	and his family	contribution, and	transactions is required.
	and existing	through an	goods, service or	,
				•

guarantees Among the top 30 chaebol, were to be eliminated, by March 2000, . (MRFTA, Article 10-2) To facilitate corporate takeovers, the requirement that a shareholder and related parties acquiring 25 percent of the shares of a listed company must tender for a majority of the company's shares was eliminated by an amendment of	intricate web of cross-company shareholdings and intra-group loans and guarantees	loan transactions; or - where a third party substantially controls the business policy of both transaction parties and both parties share the same interest by reason of capital contribution, and goods, service or loan transactions .	
company's shares was eliminated by an			

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